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I. Introduction 
During the Bush Administration’s first term, even as America’s armed forces were 
fighting wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the Pentagon embraced policies to 
globalize the American defense industrial base.i Rather than relying on its 
traditional U.S. suppliers, the Pentagon increased both its openness to shopping 
overseas for weapons systems, and its tolerance for foreign purchases of U.S. 
defense businesses.  Pentagon officials argued that the foreign sourcing of products, 
components, and materials would actually be a good thing for all but the most 
defense-critical technologies, even claiming that this would lead to faster innovation 
while cutting costs. 
 
Defense industry officials have echoed this position, arguing that the Department of 
Defense (DOD) should not be restricted to domestic suppliers for its products.  For 
example, in opposition to proposals to include “Buy American” provisions in defense 
authorization legislation, the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) warned that 
restricting foreign imports would drive up the cost of defense products and prevent 
access to the most advanced electronics and information technologies from the 
commercial marketplace.  The AIA notes, for example, that aerospace platforms use 
information technologies and electronics systems, such as flat panel displays, which 
are no longer made in the United States.ii 
  
Alarmed about the growing dependence of the U.S. defense systems on foreign 
suppliers for critical products and technologies, industry and labor leaders, as well 
as Congress members, have warned that the Pentagon’s policy of increasing this 
dependency will contribute to the erosion of the nation’s defense industrial capacity, 
and consequently, undermine national security.  The Pentagon and defense industry 
responses to these critics, and to those who support Buy American requirements, 
are not only contradictory, but, ironically, highlight the fundamental challenge the 
nation confronts in maintaining a strong defense industrial base—the continuing 
decline in U.S. manufacturing.   
 
Pentagon officials have acknowledged that there are areas of advanced technology 
critical to military systems—armor plate steel, defense-specific integrated circuits, 
night vision goggles—in which domestic capacity is insufficient.iii  But beyond this 
short list, they have claimed that foreign sourcing has no impact on America’s long-
term defense readiness—that is, the U.S. military relies little on foreign suppliers for 
critical technologies, components, and systems, and the U.S. industrial base is 
sufficiently robust to supply most of its needs.  Yet, almost in the same breath, they 
seem to admit that the United States lacks the necessary industrial capacity to 
supply many important goods that the military needs.   
 
Indeed, Pentagon officials have opposed efforts to require preference for domestic 
suppliers over foreign sourcing in defense procurement, on the basis that many 
foreign products are superior in reliability and performance, while costing less than 
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those made domestically.  For example, aside from the lack of U.S. capacity in flat 
panel displays and information technologies noted above, which has required the 
DOD to search for foreign suppliers for these critical products, DOD and aerospace 
industry officials have raised concerns about the viability of the U.S. machine tool 
industry to supply the ultra-high precision tools needed to replace existing tools and 
meet future demand for these products.iv  
 
In short, there is a tacit acceptance, despite all the Pentagon and defense industry 
rhetoric in support of globalizing defense procurement, that the United States lacks a 
sufficiently robust commercial industrial base to supply many vital products needed 
for maintaining a strong defense industrial base.  The problem is not just in a handful 
of very specialized items designed to meet narrow defense requirements (or 
milspecs), but the “eradication of U.S. industry capability,” according to Col. Michael 
Cole, deputy chief of the Joint Enabling Command of the U.S. Joint Forces Command.  
Cole also warns in a recent paper that current strategies to deal with an industrial 
base that is increasingly unable to supply the military with manufactured parts and 
electronic components are not working.v  
 
Cole’s is a welcome voice emanating from the Pentagon, which is now under 
different management from the one that first promulgated the globalization policy.  
Over the past few years, Cole’s view has been echoed—or at least given added 
credence—by a growing number of analysts from industry, labor, government, 
academia, and think tanks.vi  But the underlying premise is not new.  As historian 
Paul Kennedy wrote in his 1989 classic, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: “To be 
a Great Power—by definition, a state capable of holding its own against any other 
nation—demands a flourishing economic base,”vii which in turn, cannot be sustained 
without a strong, flourishing manufacturing sector.  That is, the health of the overall 
manufacturing base is fundamental for assuring the health of the defense industrial 
base.  Conversely, the Pentagon’s support for globalizing defense procurement not 
only reflects the growing inability of our industrial base to meet national security 
needs, but in itself contributes to the ongoing unraveling of the nation’s overall 
industrial capacity. 
 
The purpose of this report, conducted by High Road Strategies, LLC (HRS) of 
Arlington, VA is to examine the extent of this unraveling, and the resulting 
weakening of America’s defense industrial capacity in the coming decades.  The 
approach taken here, however, is different than other efforts to assess the defense 
industrial base and its reliance on foreign sources of supply for critical items.  Most 
of these efforts, especially the periodic assessments of defense preparedness that 
the Pentagon itself regularly undertakes, tend to focus very narrowly on a relatively 
limited group of technological products and the industries—or segments in those 
industries—that supply those parts, that the DOD deems vital for meeting defense 
needs.   
 
Instead, the study reported on here analyzes a large body of evidence—drawn from 
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industry and government sources, the professional literature, and many other 
sources—in an effort to examine the extent that the deterioration of the overall U.S. 
manufacturing base is contributing to the erosion of the nation’s defense industrial 
base.   That is, its focus is on assessing the health and competitiveness of the nation’s 
civilian industrial base upon which a strong defense industrial base—including the 
ability to produce specialized defense-critical products—ultimately rests.  
Specifically, the study: 
 Analyzes key domestic and international trends—which taken 
together show that the foundations of U.S. manufacturing have been 
deteriorating across the board, especially over the past decade.   
 Describes the linkages between manufacturing and the defense 
industrial base, and how erosion in a wide range of American 
manufacturing industries is hurting the domestic capacity to supply 
critical products for national security, which has been forcing the 
Pentagon to depend on less secure foreign sources.   
 Explores how a diminishing domestic manufacturing base also 
contributes to a decline in American technological leadership and 
innovation capacity, which is widely recognized to be vital for 
maintaining U.S. defense capabilities.    
 
Although the U.S. domestic manufacturing base remains the world’s largest, most 
productive and technologically advanced, its economic and technological lead in 
many important sectors vanished years ago, and many of the remaining areas of 
superiority and strength face powerful challenges in the coming years.  The signs of 
industrial decline reflected by major domestic and global economic indicators, the 
threat to innovation and the loss of America’s technology edge, and the shrinking 
skilled workforce and loss of science, engineering and manufacturing know-how, 
that this study shows are particularly worrisome.  These trends are troubling 
enough for America’s economic future, and for working families and communities 
around the United States—especially in light of the financial and economic crisis of 
2008-2009, which has led to one of the highest levels of unemployment in U.S. 
history since the Great Depression.  The danger to our national security—at home 
and abroad—that these trends also signify, should elevate the revitalization of 
American manufacturing to a very high priority among policy makers.     
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II.  Indicators of Industrial Decline 
No single indicator can by itself represent economy-wide manufacturing capabilities 
or trends.  But several key indicators of domestic economic performance and global 
competitiveness, when taken together, do provide strong evidence that America’s 
manufacturing base has been greatly weakened over the last decade.    
 
Economic indicators such as value-added output, industrial capacity and capacity 
utilization, employment and number of establishments are measures of domestic 
industrial capability, activity, and strength, and together reflect an economy’s ability 
to maintain and increase output growth over the long haul.   Global competitiveness 
indicators such as the balance of trade in goods and import penetration rate reflect 
the extent to which U.S. manufacturers are able to compete in the U.S.’s own markets 
against foreign producers.  (See Box A for definitions.)   While the domestic 
indicators point to a sustained diminishment of U.S. manufacturing economic 
performance, production capacity and capability, the global indicators reflect a 
corresponding loss of domestic markets by American manufacturers to foreign 
competitors.  The principal historical trends for these indicators are presented 
below. 
 
Box A—ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
 
Domestic Indicators 
 Value-added is defined by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) as an 
industry's gross output (sales or receipts and other operating income, commodity 
taxes, and inventory change) minus its intermediate inputs (energy, raw materials, 
semi-finished goods, and purchased services).  It also measures an industry’s 
contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  Its components include the 
returns to labor (compensation of employees), returns to capital (gross operating 
surplus) and returns to government (taxes on production and imports less 
subsidies).viii 
 Industrial capacity is defined by the Federal Reserve Board (the Fed) as the greatest 
level of output that an industry’s factories can practicably sustain.  Capacity 
utilization, also monitored by the Fed, is the share of that capacity actually being 
utilized to generate an output.ix 
 The number of establishments for each industry sector is reported in the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), which 
includes data on establishments, employment, and wages by size of establishment 
for the first quarter of each year.  Establishment sizes are divided into nine 
categories based on number of employees working at an establishment (from under 
5 employees to over 1,000 employees).x  The number of establishments should be 
distinguished from the number of American manufacturing firms that may own 
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multiple manufacturing plants in different locations.  That is, the establishment 
figures refer to the actual number of separate locations where manufacturing 
activity occurs, regardless of ownership. 
 Manufacturing employment data from the BLS’s Current Employment Statistics (CES) 
survey covers total payroll employment for all industries classified as manufacturing 
according to the 2007 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS 31-33).   
Global Competitiveness Indicators 
 The international trade balance in goods is measured by subtracting the total 
amount of goods (merchandise supplies, raw materials, and products) imported into 
the United States from the total exported.   A trade deficit occurs when imports 
exceed exports; a trade surplus occurs when exports exceed imports.  This figure is 
the most widely cited trade-related measure of American manufacturing’s health.xi 
 The import penetration rate (IPR) measures the extent to which imports substitute 
for domestically produced goods in the domestic consumption of these goods.  
Large IPRs imply that a large share of U.S. consumption of a good is being met by 
foreign sources.  Increases in IPRs over a given period imply that foreign imports 
have replaced goods produced domestically at the beginning of that period.  IPR 
data are not kept by the U.S. government but can be calculated from the import, 
export, and domestic output figures compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau.xii  The U.S. 
Business Industry Council (USBIC) Education Foundation has calculated IPRs for 115 
six-digit NAICS-based high-tech, capital-intensive industries, including every 
manufacturing sector judged to be a major contributor to the nation’s economic 
health, as well as to its security.xiii 
 
 
a. Indicators of Domestic Economic Performance    
America’s manufacturing sector is still the largest and most productive in the world, 
but there are serious signs of weakening in its foundation.  Although America’s 
industrial competitiveness problems first appeared in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
erosion in America’s manufacturing capabilities began to deepen in the first half of 
the 2000s decade.  There were indications of a modest recovery in manufacturing 
performance between 2004-2007.  However, in 2008 the U.S. economy was plunged 
into one of the worst recessions in its history, dragging U.S. manufacturing output 
and employment down to new lows.    
 
The impact of the recession has been felt throughout the manufacturing sector, 
including in many industries important to the national security base.   There is a 
great deal of uncertainty about the extent to which U.S. manufacturing will recover 
as the economy pulls out of the recession.  The long-term trends, however, suggest 
that the erosion of U.S. manufacturing capacity and competitiveness is likely to 
continue.  
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Decline and weak growth of value-added output.  Although growth in U.S. 
manufacturing real value-added has historically been positive, recent value-added 
trends strongly suggest erosion in manufacturing’s economic strength over the past 
decade.  Value-added is a key measure of an industry’s domestic economic 
performance.  It reflects the amount of an industry’s total output value that can be 
attributed to the labor and capital inputs that an industry directly employs.  It also 
shows an industry’s contribution to the nation’s GDP.  Since 2000, the 
manufacturing value-added share of U.S. GDP has been declining at a much faster 
rate, its annual contribution to the percent change in real GDP has been much 
smaller, and its real annual growth rate has been substantially slower, compared to 
earlier periods.  
 
Manufacturing value-added (in current-year dollars) as a share of GDP has been 
falling for decades.  Although from 1947 to 1968 this share never dropped below 25 
percent, it fell steadily after 1968, down to 14.5 percent in 2000.  Manufacturing’s 
shrinking GDP share does not necessarily indicate weakening capacity.  This trend 
also reflects the relatively faster growth of large service and information sectors, 
which, at least in part, was spurred by innovations and products generated by the 
manufacturing sector. 
 
However, since 2000 manufacturing’s GDP share has fallen at almost twice the 
average annual rate of the previous fifteen-year period—down to 11.5 percent in 
2008.  Similarly, as figure 1 shows, over the 1980s, manufacturing’s average annual 
contribution to the real GDP growth rate was more than twice its contribution than 
during the 2000-2008 period—and over the 1990s it was 2½ times greater.xiv   
 
Correspondingly, although U.S. manufacturing’s real value-added annual growth has 
generally been positive, tracking GDP growth, its annual rate of growth since 2000 
has been substantially lower than in prior decades.  Figure 2 shows that 
manufacturing’s average real annual growth rate was only 1.3 percent between 
2000-2008, substantially lower than the average growth rate over any prior decade; 
for example, it was less than a third of the previous decade’s average real annual 
rate of growth.  
 
These trends are reflected at the disaggregated industrial level.  The durable goods 
manufacturing sector’s annual real value-added growth rate from 2000 to the 
present has only been about 40 percent of its growth during the 1990s, and the 
nondurable goods manufacturing rate turned from positive to negative.  As table I 
illustrates, nine major manufacturing industrial sectors experienced negative 
average real annual growth rates in their value-added since 2000. All but one had 
positive growth rates in the decade before.   Five other industries still maintained 
positive average growth rates from 2000 to 2008, but lower than the prior decade’s 
average rate—in a few instances, substantially lower.    
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These two sets of industries, durable and nondurable goods, which had weakening 
or negative rates of real-value-added growth after 2000, include several industries 
important to the defense base.  This includes non-metallic mineral products, 
primary metals, fabricated metal products, electrical equipment, appliances, and 
components, motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts, plastics and rubber 
products, and most significantly, computer and electronic products.  The computer 
and electronic parts industry, whose real annual growth rate is significantly higher 
than any other, still had only half the average real annual growth rate from 2000-
2007, than it experienced through the 1990s.  
 
Figure 1 
Manufacturing’s Value-Added Average Annual  
Contribution to GDP Growth Rate  
 
 
The relatively high, real value-added growth of the computer and electronics parts 
industry’s (NAICS 334) reflects the way the federal government calculates this 
particular measure—i.e., using a quality-adjusted (a.k.a. hedonic) price index 
incorporated into the price deflator.  The quality-adjustment is based on the 
assessment that units of production in this sector (especially, microchips) are much 
more powerful, and therefore create greater value in the economy, at the same or 
lower prices than in preceding years—a reflection of “Moore’s Law” which states 
that microprocessors double in processing speed and power every 18-24 months.   
However, the average annual growth rate for current year value-added, which does 
not take into account this quality adjustment, was substantially lower than the real 
growth rate for this industry between 1990-2000—6.8 percent per year versus 28.1 
High Road Strategies 
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percent—and was actually negative—a -2.7 percent average growth rate—between 
2000 and 2007. xv  
 
Important outliers to this trend include the transportation equipment (which 
includes aerospace and shipbuilding), chemical products, and machinery industries, 
which experienced higher real value-added growth after 2000 compared to the 
earlier decade.  That said, it is likely that value-added growth for all industries has 
deteriorated since 2007, and perhaps suffered more significant declines as the 
recession and financial crisis deepened in 2008 and 2009.   This was reflected in 
manufacturing’s 2.7 percent decline in real value-added in 2008, and comparable 
declines in durable and nondurable manufacturing (-1.3 percent and -4.6 percent, 
respectively).  
 
Figure 2 
Manufacturing Value-Added Real Average Annual Growth Rate 
 
 
 
Weak industrial capacity growth and declining capacity utilization.  
Growth in manufacturing industrial capacity has been tepid since 2000 compared to 
previous periods, back to 1972.xvi   As figure 3 shows, the industrial capacity index 
for manufacturing (NAICS 31-33) grew at a modest rate of 1.8 points per year from 
1972-1994, accelerated to 6.8 per year during the expansion after the recession of 
the early 1990s, and slowed to only 1.3 per year from 2000 on.  If high-tech 
production industries—computer and electronic products (NAICS 334)—are 
excluded, manufacturing capacity growth slowed markedly from 1994 through 
2000 (to 3.5 points per year), and was very slow (0.3 per year) after 2000.   
 
High Road Strategies 
     
 
9 
HRS/JSY—Manufacturing Insecurity 
 
These differences reflect the rapid growth in high-tech capacity in the 1990s and 
into the early 2000s, relative to all other manufacturing sectors, though this growth 
also slowed after 2000.  The high-tech industrial capacity values are calculated using 
hedonic or quality-adjusted price indices, which were also applied in calculating real 
value-added (see above).   As a result, industrial capacity for this sector appeared to 
grow steadily, even as other industries’ capacities slowed or declined.  Hence, the 
industrial capacity indices for manufacturing and durable goods are somewhat 
inflated by inclusion of this sector. 
 
Table I 
Average Annual Percent Change in Real Value-Added Output                       
by Industry Sector, 1990-2000 and 2000-2007(8)* 
Industry Sector 
Ave. Annual Percent Change                         
[Chained (2000) Dollars] 
1990-2000 2000-2007(8)* 
      Manufacturing* 4.5 1.3 
        Durable goods* 6.6 2.7 
          Wood products -0.6 0.2 
          Nonmetallic mineral products 3.6 -0.4 
          Primary metals 2.7 -1.9 
          Fabricated metal products 3.0 0.4 
          Machinery 0.6 1.7 
          Computer and electronic products 28.1 14.1 
          Electrical equipment, appliances, and components 1.9 0.5 
          Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts 5.3 4.6 
          Other transportation equipment -2.7 3.0 
          Furniture and related products 3.0 -0.2 
          Miscellaneous manufacturing 3.6 3.1 
        Nondurable goods* 1.6 -0.4 
          Food and beverage and tobacco products 1.2 1.1 
          Textile mills and textile product mills 1.5 -3.7 
          Apparel and leather and allied products -1.9 -5.6 
          Paper products 0.5 -0.9 
          Printing and related support activities 0.1 -0.5 
          Petroleum and coal products 6.4 -0.5 
          Chemical products 1.8 3.5 
          Plastics and rubber products 5.5 -1.1 
*  Later period data are for manufacturing, durable goods and nondurable goods is for 2000-2008. 
Source:  Bureau of Economic Analysis   
 
Nevertheless, the industrial capacity indices for both manufacturing and for 
manufacturing excluding high tech industries actually declined in the early 2000s,xvii 
High Road Strategies 
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and again in 2009, when the industrial capacity index for manufacturing excluding 
high-tech fell by nearly 1 percent—the first decline in the nearly 70 years during 
which this data has been available.  Durable goods and nondurable goods capacity 
growth followed a similar pattern, as did that for nonmetallic mineral products, 
primary metals, fabricated metal products, machinery, electrical equipment and 
appliances, motor vehicles and parts, and aerospace and miscellaneous 
equipment—all industries important to the defense industrial base. 
 
Figure 3 
Change in Industrial Capacity for Manufacturing  
for Selected Industry Sectors 
  
 
Along with the weak manufacturing capacity growth rate since 2000, recovery in the 
utilization of that capacity was slow after a sharp drop during the recession in 2001.  
Manufacturing capacity utilization’s peaks and valleys corresponds to expansions 
and contractions in the economy.  As figure 4 shows, the peaks have progressively 
fallen since 1972.  The lowest peak in annual capacity utilization was 79.2 percent in 
2006, which was slightly lower than the average utilization rate throughout the 
1972-2008 period.  Capacity utilization then fell precipitously to 67 percent in 2009, 
which is the lowest level for at least the past four decades.   
 
 
High Road Strategies 
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Figure 4 
Manufacturing Capacity Utilization, 1972-2008 
 
 
A comparison of annual utilization rates for key industrial sectors averaged over 
1972-1999 and 2000-2009 is shown in figure 5.  Utilization was substantially higher 
for almost all the industries in the earlier period compared to the later period, 
though the latter numbers reflect the sharp decline associated with the extreme 
recessionary contraction experienced since late 2007.xviii 
 
Sharp decline in the number of manufacturing establishments.  After 
steadily growing in the 1990s, the number of manufacturing establishments declined 
sharply after 1999.  The total number of manufacturing establishments of all sizes 
grew by 25,967 or nearly 6.6 percent, from 1990-1998, but shrank by over 51,000 
or 12.5 percent, between 1998-2008 (see figure 6).  An additional 5,730 
establishments disappeared in 2009, bringing the total net decline of the number of 
manufacturing establishments to over 57,000 since 1998.   
 
Manufacturing establishments with less than 500 employees account for 99 percent 
of the total number of such establishments.xix  Nevertheless, the trend for the total 
number of establishments of all sizes (figure 6) is replicated for nearly every size 
category—i.e., establishments with under 100 employees, with 100-499 employees, 
with 500-999 employees, and over 1,000 employees (figure 7).   While about 85 
percent of closures occurred among establishments of less than 100 employees, the 
number of large establishments having more than 500 employees fell by nearly 
1,600, or by a third, after 1998—a loss of one in three plants of that size.  Large 
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numbers of intermediate-sized plants (100-500 employees)—over 6,000—also 
closed their doors.   
Figure 5 
Average Annual Capacity Utilization, Key Industries 
 
 
Figure 6 
Number of Manufacturing Establishments 
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The trends in establishment numbers are very similar for almost every 
manufacturing sector (figure 8).  Most major sectors (3-digit NAICS)—machinery, 
computer and electronic products, plastics and rubber products, wood products, 
paper manufacturing, electrical equipment and appliances, fabricated metal 
products, primary metals, and transportation equipment—added establishments of 
all sizes between 1990-1998, but shed establishments after 1999, sometimes in 
large numbers.  A couple of sectors, chemical manufacturing and nonmetallic 
mineral products, gained establishments in both periods—but at a lower rate after 
1998 than before—while two others, apparel and textiles, suffered significant losses 
throughout the 1990-2008 timeframe.xx 
 
Every major manufacturing sector experienced a net loss of large establishments 
with 500 or more workers in this period.  These trends are especially notable 
because of the large numbers of workers affected, as well as the disproportionate 
economic impacts on communities, when these large manufacturing facilities close.  
The data show that every single major manufacturing sector experienced a loss of 
such large establishments after 1998.   
 
Figure 7 
Change in Number of Manufacturing Establishments  
by Size (number of employees) 
 
 
In the durable goods sector, the machinery, electrical equipment and appliances, 
primary metals, fabricated metal products, computer and electronic products and 
wood products industries each lost from about 30 percent to 40 percent or more, 
and nonmetallic mineral products saw a decline of over half, of their large facilities.   
In the nondurable sector, textile mills and products and apparel lost well over 60 
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percent, paper manufacturing and plastics and rubber lost over 30 percent, and 
chemical manufacturing lost over a quarter, of plants with over 500 workers.xxi 
 
Figure 8 
Change in Number of Establishments by Industry Sector 
 
 
Dramatic loss of manufacturing jobs.  As evidenced in figure 9, 
manufacturing employment has fluctuated with the business cycle, but steadily 
declined after its historic high of 19.5 million jobs in 1979.  There have been 
recoveries after sharp losses in earlier recessionary periods, but the peaks have 
been progressively lower in a pattern similar to the fluctuation in capacity 
utilization discussed above.  The latest peak was in 1998—17.6 million jobs—a 
product of the Internet and IT-driven boom of the mid-late 1990s.    
 
The 2 million net jobs lost over the twenty-year period between the two peaks, 
though not insignificant, does not compare to the dramatic loss in manufacturing 
employment that followed in the decade from 1998-2009.  Even before the 
recession and financial crisis starting in late 2007, the manufacturing workforce was 
shrinking at an alarming rate.  Between August 2000 and February 2004 
manufacturing jobs were lost for a stunning 43 consecutive months—the longest 
such stretch since the Great Depression.  Manufacturing employment continued to 
fall well after the end of the 2001 recession, and by December 2007, over 3.9 million 
manufacturing jobs had been lost since the March 1998 employment peak.  The 
losses have deepened significantly in the current recession, with another 2.2 million 
manufacturing jobs lost by the end of 2009.  This brings the total number of 
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manufacturing workers who have lost their jobs over the last decade to 6.1 
million!xxii 
 
 
 
Figure 9 
Manufacturing Employment, 1977-2009 
 
 
In total, manufacturing (NAICS 31-33) and its main divisions, durable and 
nondurable goods manufacturing, lost one-third of its workforce since 1998.  As 
table II shows, no major sector (NAICS 3-digit) within these larger categories was 
spared.xxiii   
 
In most of the industries especially important to the defense base—computer and 
electronic products, electrical equipment and appliances, machinery, primary 
metals, transportation equipment, and fabricated metal products—job losses as a 
percent of total employment have risen to startling levels.  In the durable goods 
industries, the losses have ranged from one-fifth to nearly half of 1998 employment 
levels.  In nondurable goods manufacturing, the losses have ranged from only 6 
percent (food manufacturing) to nearly three-quarters (textiles, apparel) of their 
original workforces between March 1998 and December 2009. 
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There are several factors contributing to manufacturing employment decline, 
though the recent sharp decline is attributable to the deep recession that began in 
December 2007.  The extent to which productivity gains and trade-related factors 
(imports, global outsourcing) have contributed to the manufacturing job decline 
since the late 1970s—and the rapid decline between 1998 and 2008—is the subject 
of intense debate, as will be discussed below.  Regardless of the cause, the 
correlation between manufacturing job losses and the net loss of manufacturing 
establishments over the same periods, especially since the late 1990s, is 
unmistakable.    
 
Table II 
Change in Manufacturing Employment by Sector, 3/98-12/09 
NAICS Industry 
Change in Employment 
No. of Jobs Percent 
31-33 Manufacturing -6,108,000 -34.6 
    Durable goods -3,912,000 -35.7 
321 Wood products -258,200 -42.5 
327 Nonmetallic mineral products -148,400 -27.9 
331 Primary metals -295,400 -45.7 
332 Fabricated metal products -476,000 -27.3 
333 Machinery -551,300 -36.2 
334 Computer and electronic products -757,800 -40.9 
335 
Electrical equipment and 
appliances 
-230,600 -39.0 
336 Transportation equipment -766,500 -36.8 
337 Furniture and related products -274,600 -43.1 
339 Miscellaneous manufacturing -152,600 -21.0 
    Nondurable goods -2,196,000 -32.8 
311 Food manufacturing -97,900 -6.3 
312 Beverages and tobacco products -24,900 -11.9 
313 Textile mills -308,900 -71.5 
315 Apparel -477,000 -74.1 
316 Leather and allied products -56,900 -66.5 
322 Paper and paper products -231,500 -36.8 
323 
Printing and related support 
activities 
-328,200 -39.6 
324 Petroleum and coal products -23,700 -17.5 
325 Chemicals -200,800 -20.2 
326 Plastics and rubber products -332,100 -35.0 
Data Source: BLS 
 
Figure 10 illustrates the close linkage between manufacturing establishment and 
employment trends.  For all establishment sizes, the change in number of 
establishments and number of jobs seems to track closely.  Figure 11 shows that this 
pattern, with some exceptions, is repeated for the major industry sectors (3-digit 
NAICS), as well.    
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It is notable that although small establishments with 100 or fewer workers 
accounted for over 90 percent of all manufacturing establishments, they employed 
only one-third of the total number of manufacturing workers in 2008.  In contrast, 
even though plants with 500 or more employees accounted for only 1 percent of 
establishments, they employed 28 percent of the manufacturing workforce.   
Figure 10 
Changes in Numbers of Manufacturing Establishments and Employment, 
by Establishment Size (number of employees) 
 
 
Figure 11 
Changes in Number of Manufacturing Establishments and Employment, 
by Industry Sector, 1998-2008 
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Mid-sized plants (100-499 employees) accounted for the remaining 7 percent of 
establishments and 37 percent of the workers.  Correspondingly, the shedding of 
large and mid-sized establishments was associated with the lion’s share of 
manufacturing jobs lost between 1998-2008; large plants accounted for only 3 
percent of establishment losses but nearly half of the reduction in manufacturing 
jobs, and mid-sized plants accounted for 12 percent of establishment losses and 
one-third of the jobs shed in manufacturing over the last decade.xxiv 
 
b. Indicators of Global Competitiveness  
Paralleling the trends of internal weakening of America’s manufacturing capabilities 
described above, are clear signs of America’s declining competitiveness in global 
markets.  These are indicated by growing trade deficits in goods, including in 
advanced technology products, and the penetration of foreign imports into U.S. 
markets across the spectrum of manufacturing industries.   
 
Starting in the 1970s, U.S. manufacturers have been facing challenges from 
international competitors—starting with the Japanese and Europeans in the 1980s. 
But over the past decade, China has begun to emerge as America’s leading economic 
competitor, especially in manufacturing.  As the trends below show, the United 
States has suffered from a massive, and steadily growing, international trade deficit 
in goods, especially with China, and a rapid expansion of foreign competitors 
capturing U.S. markets in numerous industries, including many which are critically 
important for supplying the U.S. defense industrial base.  
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Growing trade deficits.  As figure 12 shows, the U.S. trade deficit in goods has 
been growing since 1976, and at an especially rapid rate since 1998, rising to a 
record 828 billion USD in 2006.  It remained above 800 billion USD for the next two 
years—hitting 816 billion USD in 2008.  That is, the United States imported more 
goods than it exported at a rate of 2.2 billion USD a day.  In real terms, the deficit in 
goods in 2008 was 18 times larger than it was in 1980, and equal to nearly 6 percent 
of U.S. GDP.xxv 
 
In addition, as figure 13 illustrates, the United States has been running large, chronic 
trade deficits in nearly every major U.S. manufacturing sector.  Most of the 
traditional manufacturing sectors—apparel, primary metals, electrical equipment, 
appliances and components, fabricated metal products, textile mill products—have 
significant trade deficits.  Some of the largest deficits, however, occur in 
transportation equipment (despite large U.S. aerospace surpluses) and computers 
and electronics products, which are especially critical to the defense industrial 
base.xxvi  
 
 
 
Figure 12 
U.S. Trade Deficit in Goods, 1976-2008 [Census Basis] 
 
 
Figure 13 
U.S. Trade Balance by Manufacturing Sector, 2000 & 2008 
High Road Strategies Source: Census Bureau 
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The United States also has run large, chronic goods trade deficits with almost every 
major trading country and region in the world.xxvii  After Canada, China is America’s 
second largest trading partner, followed closely by Mexico, Japan and Germany.  The 
United States has long had a goods deficit with each of these countries, but the U.S. 
trade deficit with China by far exceeds its goods deficit with any of its other trading 
partners.  This gap has grown exponentially since 1985 (see figure 14).  By 2008, the 
dollar amount of this imbalance had more than tripled—reaching a record 268 
billion USD—since 2001, the year Congress granted China permanent normal trade 
relations and China joined the World Trade Organization.   Although the deficit in 
goods with China dipped by about 15 percent to 227 billion USD in 2009 due to the 
recession, it already showed signs of growing again in 2010. 
 
Figure 14 
U.S. Imports, Exports and Trade Balance With China, 1985-2009 
High Road Strategies Source: Census Bureau 
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Advanced Technology Products.  Especially troubling from a national 
security standpoint is the shift in the U.S. trade balance in advanced technology 
products (ATP)xxviii from a surplus to a deficit, as illustrated in figure 15.  ATP has 
traditionally been a source of American comparative advantage in international 
trade.  Yet since 1997, the ATP trade balance has declined at a rapid rate, recording 
deficits since 2001.  By 2004, the ATP deficit grew to an all time high of 62 billion 
USD, though it fell back in 2008 and especially in 2009, again, a result of the 
recession. 
 
As figure 16 shows, although half of the sectors that comprise ATP—especially 
electronics and aerospace—continue to enjoy trade surpluses, the other half show 
significant and growing trade deficits. The information and communications 
products sector in particular has large, escalating deficits.  The deficits for life 
sciences and optoelectronics are relatively smaller, but also have been growing.  
Much smaller still, but still consistently experiencing negative trade balances, are 
the nuclear technology and advanced materials sectors.  In any event, the existence 
of large, chronic U.S. trade deficits across the board and even in many of the most 
capital- and knowledge-intensive sectors indicates that, whatever the fortunes of its 
multinational companies and their global production networks, the United States is 
losing competitiveness as a site for manufacturing. 
 
Figure 15 
U.S. Trade Balance in Advanced Technology Products, 1990-2009  
High Road Strategies Source: Census Bureau 
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 Import penetration.  Another critical indicator of U.S. manufacturing 
competitiveness, the import penetration rate (IPR) (see Box A)—the share of the U.S. 
market held by imports for a good or industry—has also been declining.  Thus, IPRs 
can be seen as indicators of the extent to which trade factors are eroding domestic 
manufacturing production and jobs.  In many respects, IPRs are better indicators of 
the competitiveness of manufacturing located in the United States than the trade 
balance figures. 
 
The figures on this head-to-head competition between U.S. and foreign-based 
producers in the same U.S. market reveal that U.S. producers have lost significant 
ground.  The data show an across-the-board, aggregate increase for 114 high-tech 
and capital-intensive sectors of 61 percent—from 21.4 percent of domestic 
consumption to 34.3 percent—between 1997 and 2007.  That is, imports grew from 
one-fifth to over one-third of the total value of this large, diverse group of products 
consumed domestically in just one decade. 
 
Figure 16 
U.S. Trade Balance in Advanced Technology Products, 
By Sector, 2002, 2005, and 2008 
High Road Strategies Source: Census Bureau 
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Table III lists the 25 items with the largest IPRs in 2007, ranging from 52.5 percent 
(relays and industrial controls) to 93.5 percent (electric capacitors and parts).  
Except for three of these items, the IPRs increased in every case between 1997 and 
2007 by a range of 2 percent (computer storage devices) to 70 percent (household 
furnishings).  The average IPR increase across all the items in the group was 26 
percent to 68 percent, rising from an average IPR of 42 percent—an increase of 
nearly two-thirds—over that time period.xxix  Moreover, although the NAICS 
industrial classification system was introduced in 1997, converting its categories to 
the corresponding codes for older systems shows that the increase in IPRs dates 
from at least 1992.xxx 
 
c. The Eroding Base 
As already noted, no single indicator is necessarily evidence of a decline in 
manufacturing capabilities.  But when the indicators are lined up alongside each 
other and linkages between them clarified, a pattern emerges that strongly suggests 
that manufacturing in the United States has been losing significant capacity and 
strength for well over a decade, with roots going back much earlier.  The U.S. 
manufacturing base remains large and robust, and recovery is still possible—
indeed, is essential for the long-term health of the overall economy—but the signs of 
erosion are clear and troubling. 
Table III 
High Road Strategies Source: Census Bureau 
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Top 25 Products with Largest IPRs in 2007 
Industry 
Code 
Description 2007 1997 
 % Change 
1997- 2007  
314129 Household furnishings 93.5 23.2 303.3 
322110 Pulp mill products 92.7 45.2 105.0 
322122 Newsprint mill products 90.6 54.3 66.8 
325411 Medicinals and botanicals 85.8 49.5 73.3 
332911 Industrial Valve Manufacturing 78.2 34.4 127.3 
333220 Plastics and rubber industrial machinery 77.3 43.4 78.2 
333512 Metal-cutting machine tools 76.9 58.6 31.3 
333513 Metal-forming machine tools 76.6 62.7 22.1 
333611 Turbines and turbine generator sets 71.1 25.4 179.8 
333612 Speed changers, high speed drives, and gears 70.7 38.5 83.6 
334111 Electric computers 65.5 13.9 370.3 
334112 Computer storage devices 64.9 66.7 -2.7 
334210 Telephone switch apparatus 64.5 17.7 265.3 
334220 Radio and TV broadcasting and wireless equipment 63.0 16.1 291.0 
334414 Electric capacitors and parts 62.1 69.1 -10.0 
334415 Electronic resister manufacturing 61.8 47.5 30.0 
334419 Other electric components 58.2 56.9 2.2 
334513 Industrial process control instruments 58.1 45.7 27.1 
334613 Magnetic and optical recording media 57.1 38.6 47.8 
335312 Motors and generators 56.7 28.4 99.9 
335314 Relays and industrial controls 56.3 24.1 134.1 
336111 Autos 56.0 50.4 11.0 
336120 Heavy duty trucks and chassis 55.8 62.5 -10.8 
336399 Motor vehicle parts 53.7 38.3 40.3 
336412 Aircraft engine and engine parts manufacturing 52.4 40.0 31.0 
Average Top 25 IPRs 68.0 42.0 61.7 
Source: USBIC  
 
Quality adjustments, high-tech, and manufacturing decline.   The erosion 
is apparent in the concurrent trends of weakening manufacturing value-added 
output, acceleration in manufacturing’s steady decline as a share of U.S. GDP, 
stagnant and even negative growth—the first time in seven decades—in industrial 
capacity, and the substantial drop and long-term average yearly decline in 
utilization since 2000.  It isn’t coincidental that the peak levels in both 
manufacturing capacity utilization and manufacturing employment during business 
cycle expansions (see figures 4 and 9) have fallen successively from the 1970s.  As 
industrial capacity stagnated and fell, both manufacturing employment and 
establishment numbers declined sharply from late 1999 to the present, with no 
increase at all during the weak expansion of 2002-2007.   
High Road Strategies 
     
 
25 
HRS/JSY—Manufacturing Insecurity 
 
 
ICT quality adjustments.  These trends hold in spite of the quality (hedonic) 
price adjustments the federal government uses in calculating real value-added and 
industrial capacity—which mostly applies to the computer and electronic products 
industry (NAICS 334).  As noted, quality adjustments in the value-added and 
industrial capacity indices are designed to account for the fact that for certain 
products, value contributions to the economy may be somewhat larger than 
reflected in their current prices.  This is particularly true for the high-tech 
industries—computer and electronic products, publishing industries (including 
software), information and data processing services, and computer systems design 
and related services—which the BEA calls the information-communications-
technology-producing (ICT) industries.  The quality adjustment assumes that an ICT 
product or service produced today is in effect worth exponentially more than the 
same product or service produced in prior years, even at comparable prices. 
 
With this adjustment applied, the ICT sector appears to have been a major driver of 
real GDP growth since the early 1990s, although its annual share of current year 
GDP has remained around 4-5 percent.   For example, the ICT industries accounted 
for a little less than 4 percent of U.S. GDP, but contributed to over 20 percent for real 
GDP growth in 2007—and 30 percent in 2008.      
 
Computer and electronic products is the only manufacturing industry in the ICT 
sector.   Its share of ICT value-added has slid since the late 1990s, from over 40 
percent to a little under 30 percent in 2008, as information products and services 
industries have expanded their output.  Nevertheless, it has been the largest driver 
of manufacturing real value-added, even as most other manufacturing industries 
have suffered declines during the past decade.  Although ICT’s share of GDP value-
added (current dollars) has ranged from 1 to 2 percent, its contribution to annual 
real GDP growth averaged 9 percent between 1998-2007 (it was 10 percent in 
2007) and accounted for the largest share of the manufacturing sector’s 
contribution to real GDP growth by far.  
 
A misleading indicator.  In short, though the quality adjustments to computer 
and electronic products value-added and the consequent increases in manufacturing 
real value-added are a genuine reflection of real growth in economic value, it can be 
a misleading indicator of the actual health and competitiveness of the U.S. 
manufacturing sector.  The significant growth in computer and electronic products 
real value-added over the past decades was still not sufficient to prevent weak 
performance in overall manufacturing value-added, industrial capacity and capacity 
utilization over the past decade, nor to offset the dramatic losses in manufacturing 
establishments and manufacturing employment over this period.  For example: 
 In current dollar terms, the computer and electronic products industry’s value-
added declined at an average annual rate of nearly 3 percent between 2000-
2007, even though non-deflated manufacturing value-added grew.  
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 The industry lost 5 percent of its workforce between January 1990 and March 
1998, and 41 percent between March 1998 and December 2009 (see table II).  In 
absolute terms, it lost the second largest number of jobs out of 21 industry 
sectors (3-digit NAICS)—second only to transportation equipment—in 
manufacturing, 
 The industry lost a net of 16 percent of its establishments between 1998-2008 
(figure 8), including nearly 40 percent of establishments with over 500 
employees and one-quarter of establishments with between 100 and 500 
employees.   In contrast, it gained a net of 20 percent of its establishments from 
1990-1998.    
 It had the second largest trade deficit of any manufacturing industry in 2000 (-
55 billion USD) and by far the largest deficit in 2008 (-110 billion USD) (figure 
13).    
 Information and communications products also accounted for the largest, and 
progressively increasing, share of the trade deficits in advanced technology 
products (figure 16).  
 
Trade deficits and employment losses.  Manufacturing’s erosion becomes 
even more evident when we examine the domestic economic trends in light of the 
steady growth in trade deficits and import penetration.  Generally speaking, 
increasing trade deficits in goods are a result of U.S. consumers becoming 
dependent on foreign-produced manufactured goods at the expense of domestically 
produced goods.   That is, foreign producers captured greater and greater shares of 
domestic markets as U.S. manufacturers cut capacity and/or moved their operations 
offshore to lower-cost foreign locations.  As seen below, many analysts link the large 
scale, steady losses in manufacturing employment and establishments, especially 
those since 1998, to these trade-related factors—though this correlation is disputed.  
 
 Trade, productivity and job displacement.  Simply stated, while increasing 
exports can create new jobs, expanding imports can eliminate jobs, especially if 
foreign-made items replace domestically produced goods in domestic markets.  
Therefore, if imports exceed exports—especially if this differential is large, as it is in 
the United States—there will be a net loss of jobs, potentially in significant numbers.  
Traditional economists, however, typically have argued that productivity gains and 
declining demand (i.e., as occurs during recessions) have played a far more 
important role in declining manufacturing employment, and some have claimed that 
trade has played little or no role in these losses.  In contrast to this view, several 
excellent empirical studies from the Washington, DC think-tank, the Economic 
Policy Institute (EPI), show that demand factors and productivity alone cannot 
explain the large-scale displacements shown in the data.  Moreover, they have 
estimated that millions of U.S. jobs that have been displaced or job gains foregone as 
a result of international trade, including the losses associated with specific trade 
agreements (e.g.., the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA)).xxxi  This work 
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supports the argument that a large share of the employment and establishment 
losses in U.S. manufacturing—over the past decade in particular—are linked to 
consolidations and plant closures arising from the pressures of international 
competition for domestic and foreign goods markets, and the offshoring of 
operations by large OEMs and their suppliers in almost every major manufacturing 
sector.   
 
That is to say, manufacturing employment losses, and the very large number of 
manufacturing establishments that have closed their doors since 1998, are more 
plausibly indicators of systemic erosion in the U.S. manufacturing base, than the 
result of productivity improvements or declining domestic demand.  First, although 
economic recessions clearly have been correlated with job losses, and expansions 
with job recoveries (see figure 9, for example), there have been many instances of 
employment declines even as domestic demand (during expansions) has increased.  
Most notably, even after the relatively shallow recession in 2001, manufacturing 
jobs declined sharply after the recession was technically over, and stagnated or fell 
during the past decade, even as U.S. GDP increased.   Of course, manufacturing 
employment and establishment numbers have both fallen sharply since 2008 due to 
the extreme recession and financial crisis, exacerbating the downward trends that 
already started during the late 1990s.       
 
On the other hand, productivity gains over a period of decades have contributed to 
the long-term decline in manufacturing employment, even during peak periods.  
Historically, productivity and technological change (which helps drive the former) 
have played a major role in reducing the labor cost component in manufacturing, yet 
the generated gains, until recently, have often been accompanied by new job 
creation in both manufacturing and services, and increased income for workers.  In 
principle, productivity gains have been a good thing, as they help generate economic 
growth and more available income for workers.   
 
As Economic Policy Institute (EPI) economist Josh Bivens acknowledges, although 
productivity growth has played an important role in manufacturing job loss, “this 
growth is to be welcomed over the long-run, as productivity provides the ceiling on 
how quickly living standards can rise.”xxxii  Nevertheless, Bivens’s work shows that 
domestic factors, including productivity and demand, cannot explain a major share 
of the jobs displaced in manufacturing, especially over the last decade.  For example, 
he estimates that trade deficits explain 59 percent of the decline in manufacturing 
employment between 1998-2003, and at least a third of manufacturing job loss 
between 2000-2004.xxxiii  Moreover, he noted that these estimates are a 
“conservative measure of the involuntary job displacement,” and concludes that 
they are indicators of “how trade has affected the composition of jobs in the U.S. 
labor market,” often resulting “in large income losses and even permanent damage 
to workers’ earning power.”xxxiv  
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Similarly, EPI’s Robert Scott has produced several studies estimating the number of 
jobs that have been displaced due to U.S. trade deficits.  For example, he has 
consistently argued against other economists’ predictions that NAFTA would 
generate rising trade surpluses that support the creation of domestic jobs.  He noted 
that the United States had a 1.7 billion USD trade surplus with Mexico in 1993, 
which soon transformed into a rapidly growing trade deficit that reached 74.8 
billion USD in 2007.xxxv  Scott estimated that by 2006, trade deficits with Mexico and 
Canada displaced production that had supported 1,015,290 American jobs, mostly 
in manufacturing, since NAFTA took effect in 1994.  This includes 560,000 job losses 
due to growing deficits with Mexico and 456,000 jobs lost due to the deficit with 
Canada.xxxvi 
 
China trade and job losses.  Scott has also examined the impacts of the 
growing U.S. trade deficit with China, which he argues in a 2007 report “has 
displaced huge numbers of jobs in the United States, and been a prime contributor 
to the crisis in manufacturing employment over the past six years.”xxxvii  Like many 
other trade analysts, Scott attributes China’s large and expanding trade surplus with 
the United States to currency manipulation, low labor costs (associated with 
suppression of labor rights), lax environmental regulations, and export production 
subsidies.    
 
The U.S. trade deficit with China has mushroomed since the latter’s entry into the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001—rising from 84.1 billion USD in 2001 to 
262.1 billion USD in 2007.  Scott has calculated that between 2001-2007, 2.3 million 
U.S. jobs were lost or displaced, including 366,000 in 2007 alone, due to the 
increased deficit with China, with more than two-thirds of the job losses in 
manufacturing.   Since China’s entry into the WTO, an average of 382,500 jobs per 
year were lost or displaced compared to 101,000 lost or displaced jobs per year 
from 1997-2001.  Moreover, the rising trade deficit in manufacturing goods with 
China has reduced demand for goods produced in every region of the United States, 
resulting in job displacements in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.xxxviii  
 
China also plays a prominent role in the shrinking U.S. high-tech trade balance and 
the growing advanced technology deficit.  China’s exports to the United States of 
electronics, computers, and communications equipment, as well as other products 
that use highly-skilled labor and advanced technologies, are growing much faster 
than its exports of low-value, labor-intensive products, such as apparel, shoes and 
plastic products.  For example, Scott reported that the 68 billion USD deficit in 
advanced technology products with China in 2007 is responsible for more than 25 
percent of total U.S.-China trade deficit.  Almost half of the 178 billion USD increase 
in the U.S. trade deficit with China between 2001-2007 was accounted for by rapidly 
growing imports of computers and electronic parts, which displaced 561,000 U.S. 
jobs over this period.  China has also rapidly gained advantage other advanced 
industries such as autos and aerospace.xxxix   
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Empirical studies.  Studies by Cornell researchers and the AFL-CIO Industrial 
Union Council’s (IUC) Job Export Database Project (JEDP) provide further evidence 
of a link between imports and offshoring with plant closures and mass layoffs in U.S. 
manufacturing across the nation.  First, two studies by the Cornell School of 
Industrial and Labor Relations, led by professor Kate Bronfenbrenner for the U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) present strong empirical 
evidence about the shift of production out of the United States to Mexico, China, 
India, and other Asian countries.xl  In one study, Bronfrenbrenner and Stephanie 
Luce report that from January-March 2004 there “were 69 announced or confirmed 
production shifts to Mexico, … 58 shifts to China, 31 to India, 39 to other Asian 
countries, 35 to other Latin American and Caribbean countries, 23 shifts to other 
countries including Eastern and Western Europe and Canada.”xli  They estimated 
that in 2004 as many as 406,000 US jobs would be shifted to other countries 
compared to 204,000 jobs in 2001.   
 
The AFL-CIO IUC project produced a series of job export studies for several states, 
which also provided hard data that international trade, including offshore 
production shifts, has played a larger causal role in the loss of manufacturing jobs.  
Using common data sources and a methodology similar to the one employed by 
Bronfenbrenner et al., the IUC reports examine manufacturing mass layoffs in four 
states—Ohio, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Washington.xlii  The findings of the 
reports are summarized in table IV.  
 
The IUC reports found that from 52 to 88 percent of layoffs examined for the reports 
had trade related causes.  The IUC and Bronfenbrenner studies are highly 
complementary, and both emphasized that their findings account for only a 
minimum number of trade-related job losses.  The studies show only the tip of a 
much larger iceberg of global trade pressures pervading the U.S. economy and 
influencing employers’ location and employment decisions across manufacturing 
supply chains.   
 
Productivity’s explanatory limits.  There is some evidence that productivity is 
a problematic indicator that has been incorrectly interpreted as an explanatory 
factor in manufacturing employment decline over the past decade.  Decisions about 
new technology investments are frequently—if not most often—made in response 
to global competitive pressures.  That is, technological change is not an independent, 
exogenous causal factor in the loss of manufacturing jobs.  In fact, productivity 
enhancing technology investments both accompany firms’ decisions to shed 
domestic suppliers and go offshore for cheaper suppliers or move their operations 
overseas, and enable this process. 
 
Although productivity is traditionally associated with job growth and increased 
wages over the long term, the internationalization of production enabled by 
technology may have changed this equation, as productivity gains now reflect global 
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efficiencies that do not show up as domestic economic gains in the form of jobs and 
wage growth.   
 
Table IV 
Summary of Findings, IUC State Job Loss Reports  
January 2001- May 2004 
 
Manufacturing 
Share of GSP  
Manuf. 
 Jobs Lost 
(BLS)      
Job Loss 
Impacts 
WARN-
Related 
Layoffs 
Trade-
Related 
Layoffs 
(WARN-
based)  
Trade-
Related % 
of Total. 
Layoffs 
(WARN-
based) 
New Jobs’ 
Wages 
Compared 
to Lost Jobs 
Ohio 
23.4% 
2000 GSP 
170,000 
1 in 6 
manuf. jobs 
lost 
38,830 20, 124 52% 
$11,355 
less 
Wisconsin 
25.0% 
2000 GSP 
67,500 
1 in 9 
manuf. jobs 
lost 
26,243 15,912 61% $9,312 less 
Pennsylvania 
18.4% 
2000 GSP 
161,200 
1 in 5 
manuf. jobs 
lost 
40,733 28,259 70% $12,456 less 
Washington 
12.3% 
2000 GSP  
66,700 
1 in 5 
manuf. jobs 
lost 
30,991 27,196 88% 
$18,400 
less 
      Source: Jobs Exports Database Project, Industrial Union Council, AFL-CIO 
Many of the productivity gains that some industries have seen over the past decade 
or more, have enabled global trade flows on a larger scale than ever before, due to 
the introduction of advanced information and telecommunications (Internet-
enabled business-to-consumer and business-to-business electronic commerce) and 
transportation and logistical advances,.  These advances have made it easier for 
firms to coordinate distributed operations and supply chains on a global basis, and 
have reduced the transactions costs of doing such.xliii   That is, these technology 
advances have contributed to productivity gains accompanied by increased 
international trade and offshoring—and subsequently mass layoffs and increased 
displacement of jobs. 
 
Susan Houseman of the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research has raised 
additional questions about the biases in the productivity measure in the face of 
High Road Strategies 
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large-scale outsourcing and offshoring of suppliers.  Her studies argue that U.S. 
productivity data may not sufficiently account for the lower-cost labor inputs 
embedded in intermediate materials inputs (components and parts) produced by  
foreign suppliers or U.S. producers’ offshored operations and then shipped back into 
the United States for assembly into final products.  That is, high productivity 
numbers could be inflated, since the value of U.S. products seemingly made with 
smaller amounts of domestic labor does not include the labor content of foreign-
made components and parts. For example, for 1997-2007, the offshoring of 
intermediate inputs may explain 16-26 percent of multifactor productivity growth 
for all manufacturing and 22-37 percent of growth for manufacturing less the 
computer sector.xliv     
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III.    Eroding Industrial Sectors 
The broad domestic and global economic trends examined above provide strong 
evidence that the U.S. manufacturing base is experiencing a sustained and 
potentially dangerous erosion across nearly all manufacturing industries.  Because a 
wide range of manufacturing industries include subsectors that supply products, 
components and technologies that the Pentagon considers important to defense, the 
significant declines in plant capacity and jobs raise serious concerns about U.S. 
manufacturing’s longer-term ability to remain sufficiently innovative and robust to 
meet military supply needs, especially in times of international crises.   
 
This sector examines the structure and composition of the defense industrial base, 
and how the erosion in key U.S. manufacturing industries weakens the capability of 
this base to supply goods and services important to national security.   The section 
that follows extends this examination to the loss of innovation capabilities resulting 
from the erosion of manufacturing, which threatens to undermine America’s 
technological leadership.  It also focuses on the loss of the skills and know-how 
embodied in the manufacturing workforce vital to maintaining the innovative edge 
so critical to the nation’s economic health and national security. 
 
a.  The Defense Industrial Base 
A National Research Council (NRC) study of the long-term directions of defense 
manufacturing notes that the DOD makes a distinction between what it calls defense-
unique and defense-critical products or processes.xlv   A defense-unique product or 
process is used only for defense purposes and has no commercial application.   A 
defense-critical product or process is used for defense purposes, but is more likely 
to be commercially made and have commercial applications.  For example, many 
commercially produced microprocessors and other electronic technologies 
indispensable to many defense products are defense-critical.  Microchips designed 
solely for a defense application with very stringent environmental and performance 
criteria, may be considered defense-unique.    
 
A broad domestic industrial base.  In reality, there is no bright line between 
the production systems that design, develop and manufacture defense-unique items 
with those that produce defense-critical products and processes.  As the NRC study 
points out, the boundaries between the defense industrial base—the set of 
industrial and military facilities devoted partially or entirely to the production of 
defense-related products—and commercial industry have become increasingly 
blurred.xlvi  Many of the most militarily valuable products used by the Defense 
Department are versions of commercially produced commodities modified for 
unique military functions. 
 
Pentagon evaluations of defense industrial capabilities fail to address longer-term 
trends in the domestic industrial base in the face of global market forces, 
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particularly in commercial markets, that reflect a weakening ability to supply the 
much larger number of other critical technologies and products on which the 
military depends.  
 
University of Texas at Austin engineering professor Michael Webber defines the U.S. 
defense industrial base as “the end-to-end capability within the United States to 
design and produce advanced military systems.”  The manufacturing base to 
support this capability from “materials to finished product,” he states, “is comprised 
of making, bending or shaping materials; producing components; applying 
treatments; or providing manufacturing-related services such as rapid 
prototyping.”xlvii  
 
What we call the defense industrial base, those industrial capabilities required to 
serve national security needs, both rest upon, and are embedded in, the larger 
domestic manufacturing base of the nation.  Defense systems do not solely depend 
on a handful of defense-unique, cutting-edge or emerging technologies.  They draw 
upon a vast array of technologies, materials, components, parts, and subsystems 
from across the industrial spectrum.  These range from advanced special purpose 
microchips used in missiles and smart munitions, to advanced machine tools and 
advanced composite materials, to mundane but critical items such as fasteners, ball 
bearings, uniforms and specialized protective clothing and footwear, and polymeric 
tray containers for packaged combat field rations.   
 
Correspondingly, the industrial base to supply these items is very diverse and 
multilayered. At the top of the defense industrial supply chain are the prime defense 
contractors who now primarily serve as systems integrators, assembling 
components, parts, subsystems and systems into large weapons platforms.  
Although most have some commercial operations, and in some instances, such as 
Boeing, these operations are very large—the “primes” largely depend on the 
Pentagon for a major portion of their business.  A larger number of second and third 
tier contractors are suppliers to the primes, though some contract directly with the 
Pentagon to provide specialized, defense-unique technologies, components and 
equipment.  A myriad number of lower tier suppliers serve the upper tiers, 
providing a variety of more mundane products and commodities directly to the 
military services.   
 
Many of the second and third tier, and most of the lower tier suppliers, are primarily 
or exclusively commercial enterprises.  Although many of the lower-tiered suppliers 
may have specialized divisions serving defense markets, most ultimately depend on 
maintaining competitiveness in commercial markets in order to stay in business.   
 
The broad intent of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA), as amended, is to 
ensure the health of the nation’s domestic sources of goods and services needed to 
meet national defense requirements.  The DPA defines the “domestic defense 
industrial base” as those “domestic sources which are providing, or which would be 
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reasonably expected to provide, materials or services to meet national defense 
requirements during peacetime, graduated mobilization, national emergency, or 
war.”xlviii  The central question examined in this report is whether the domestic 
“manufacturing support base,” as Webber calls it, is capable of supplying the large 
range of items needed to meet these requirements now and into the future, or 
whether the U.S. national security system become increasingly reliant on foreign 
sources for critical products and services?  
 
Increasing foreign dependency.  Despite the stated intent of the DPA and 
the findings of the studies described above, the Pentagon has adopted policies and 
procedures that no longer appear to follow the intent of the DPA.  Instead it has 
pursued a strategy that weakens the ability of “domestic sources” to meet future 
defense supplying needs, and increases the dependence of our defense industrial 
system on foreign sources, with potential adverse implications for our national and 
economic security.  As the 2005 annual report of the USCC observed:  
The Department of Defense transformed its acquisition model to reflect the 
globalized nature of the defense industrial base.  While the new model analyzes the 
availability of key technologies to maintain a strong defense, it may not adequately 
consider the long-term effects on the defense industrial base of the offshoring of 
industries that, while not classified as critical technologies, nonetheless may impact 
defense and homeland security operations.xlix 
 
There are numerous examples of defense critical technologies where domestic 
sourcing is endangered: 
 The DOD reports that domestic suppliers of propellant chemicals, space qualified 
electronics, space power sources (batteries and photovoltaics), and specialty 
metals used in military applications have “consolidated to where there are only 
one or two qualified sources in each area,” and frequently “are finding it difficult 
to justify the business to continue production.”l 
 There is strong foreign competition for five different types of batteries (nickel 
metal hydride, lithium ion, silver zinc, zinc air, thermal), photovoltaics, and fuel 
cells that the Air Force has interest in for power source applications.li  An Air 
Force report notes that many small domestic niche manufacturers supporting 
the U.S. military in these areas are in “moderate or high risk due to declining 
sales, foreign competition, and limited investment in both R&D and 
infrastructure.”lii  
 Hard disk drives and flat panel displays are considered defense critical 
technologies, but little or no production remains in the United States and 
government programs attempting to sustain domestic production of these 
products have failed.liii   
 The United States no longer has a significant commercial liquid crystal display 
(LCD) manufacturing industry, and its very limited military LCD industry 
depends on foreign sources for LCD technologies, which may not satisfy future 
     
 
35 
HRS/JSY—Manufacturing Insecurity 
 
military display panel requirements.liv 
 
Many small and medium-sized suppliers mainly serve commercial domestic and 
global markets, while tailoring a small part of their business to provide specialized 
versions of their products to military or military industrial customers.  These firms 
face increasing foreign competition domestically, and in global markets are under 
pressure to relocate or outsource some or all of their operations overseas in order 
to stay in business.   
 
Consolidations by suppliers in the face of this competition have also contributed to 
the decrease in the available number of qualified domestic sources for defense 
critical items, with small, lower-tier manufacturers especially at risk.  The failure of 
these lower-tier firms could mean a further loss of important domestic industrial 
capabilities to supply specialized products to meet defense needs.  Suppliers that 
provide commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) items for military industrial customers 
also may find that the only way to stay in business is to move part or all of their 
production offshore to low-wage locations.   
 
b.  Critical Industries 
The examples above are only the tip of a large iceberg.  To illustrate the full extent of 
the erosion of industrial capabilities and its impact on defense, and the growing 
dependency on foreign goods to fill this gap, a fuller, more systematic examination 
of a range of key industrial sectors is warranted.  Webber has conducted one such 
study, in which he evaluates the economic health of sixteen industrial sectors 
“within the manufacturing support base” of the U.S. defense industrial system, “that 
have a direct bearing on innovation and production of novel mechanical products 
and systems,” and whose output “is used directly in the design process of other 
industries.” These include the electrochemical, thermochemical and optomechanical 
sectors, as well as machine tool industries, which Webber deemed relevant to the 
innovation of mechanical systems.lv 
 
Webber’s study looks at the period between 1998-2008, and uses three indicators to 
evaluate whether an industry appeared to be eroding: employment, economic 
activity (contributions to GDP by shipments) and the number of establishments.  His 
results are summarized in table V.   Of the sixteen industries he examined, thirteen 
showed significant signs of erosion--especially since 2001, two (navigational, 
measurement, electromedical, and control instruments, machine shops) were 
healthy, and one (semiconductor machinery) was holding steady or showed signs of 
recovery.  The study only looks at the trends through September 2008, after which 
time, “demand for products in virtually every consumer and industrial category fell 
off a cliff.”lvi 
 
The profiles below provide a broader cross-section of the defense industrial base, to 
illustrate the full scope of the impact of declining manufacturing capacity on the 
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defense industrial base.  They overlap several of Webber’s sectors (semiconductors, 
printed circuit boards, machine tools), but include one sector not in his group, which 
he acknowledged is important to the nation’s innovation system (advanced 
materials), other, smaller industries such as bearings manufacturing and 
optoelectronics, and the largest systems integrator industry (aerospace).  As in 
Webber’s study, there are signs that some segments remain relatively healthy and 
globally competitive.  However, the overall prognosis is one of a serious 
weakening—occurring even before the recent recession and financial crisis—of a 
wide-range of key domestic manufacturing industries, that could undermine their 
ability to support critical defense requirements, and increase the dependency on 
foreign sources to supply vital defense materials, components, parts, and systems. 
 
i. Semiconductors 
Semiconductor manufacturing plays a prominent role in the U.S. economy as a 
source of high value-added production, high-wage jobs, productivity gains, and 
wage growth.lvii  Semiconductors also are critical to today’s information-based, 
“network-centric” warfighting capabilities.lviii As noted by William J. Spencer, 
chairman emeritus of International Sematech, a consortium of semiconductor firms 
created with federal assistance in the late 1980s to promote the industry’s 
competitiveness: “The military significance of microelectronics as the decisive 
advantage for the U.S. warfighter has increased exponentially since the 1980s.”lix   
The Defense Science Board (DSB) has called semiconductor technology and 
manufacturing leadership “a national priority that must be maintained if the U.S. 
military is to continue to lead in the application of electronics to support the 
warfighter.”lx  Preserving a world-class domestic semiconductor industry is 
therefore  vital to national security. 
 
Declining capacity and leadership.  However, while the United States 
remains one of the world’s largest manufacturers of semiconductors, it has been 
losing capacity and its leadership position in the industry for a number of years.  
Spencer summarized industry and government leaders’ concerns about this 
troubling trend: 
A combination of market forces and foreign policies is creating powerful incentives 
to shift new chip production offshore.  If this trend continues, the U.S. lead in chip 
manufacturing, equipment, and design may well erode, with important and 
unpleasant consequences for U.S. productivity growth and, ultimately, the country’s 
economic and military security.lxi 
 
These warnings were echoed in reports by the National Security Agency, as well as 
by many high-level government advisory groups, including the DSB and the 
Pentagon’s Advisory Group on Electron Devices (AGED),lxii independent bodies such 
as the National Academies of Scienceslxiii and the USCC,lxiv industry associations such 
as the Semiconductor Industry Association,lxv and Congressional leaders.lxvi  
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Table V 
Results of Michael Webber’s Study 
Erosion of Selected Defense Industrial Support Base Sectors 
NAICS Industry Employment 
Economic 
Activity 
Establishments Overall Status 
3315 Foundries    Eroded 
33211 Forging & Stamping    Eroded 
33271 Machine Shops    Healthy 
332811 Metal Heat Treating    Eroded 
332997 Industrial Pattern Manufacturing    Eroded 
333295 Semiconductor Machinery    Holding Steady 
333314 Optical Instrument and Lens    Eroded 
333511 Industrial Mold Manufacturing    Eroded 
333512 Machine Tools (Metal Cutting)    Eroded 
333513 Machine Tools (Metal Forming)    Eroded 
333514 Special Die & Tool, Die Set, Jig    Eroded 
334412 Bare Printed Circuit Boards    Eroded 
334413 Semiconductor & Related Devices    Eroded 
334418 Printed Circuit Assemblies    Eroded 
3345 Nav. Meas. & Control Instruments    Healthy 
33591 Battery Manufacturing    Eroded 
Indicator eroded;           Indicator expanded;   Indicator held steady or showed signs of recovery  
Source: Michael Webber, “Erosion of the U.S. Defense Industrial Support Base.” In Richard McCormack (ed.), Manufacturing A 
Better Future For America, Washington, DC: Alliance for American Manufacturing (2009), 245-280: 274, Figure 3.    
 
The erosion predicted in the middle of the 2000s has become increasingly apparent:   
 Webber identified semiconductor and related device manufacturing (NAICS 
334413)—semiconductors, integrated circuits, memory chips, microprocessors, 
diodes, transistors, solar cells, optoelectronic devices, and other solid-state 
devices—as an eroding industry in his defense industrial support base study.   
 The semiconductor and other electronic component manufacturing sector 
(NAICS 3344), comprised of establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing 
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semiconductors and other components for electronic applications (capacitors, 
resisters, microprocessors, printed circuit boards, electron tubes, electronic 
connectors, and computer modems), lost a net of nearly 1,200 plants of all sizes 
between 1998 and 2008, a drop of 17 percent, including 83 large establishments 
with over 500 employees (a 37 percent drop) and 58 mid-sized establishments 
of between 100-500 employees (a 41 percent loss).  
 By 2008, employment levels, number of establishments, and GDP for the 
industry had fallen below its 2001 levels.lxvii    
 According to the USBIC, imports account for nearly one-half the U.S. market for 
semiconductor and related devices—an import penetration rate of 44.5 percent 
in 2007.lxviii 
 According to the DSB, the U.S. semiconductor industry’s share of total world 
capital expenditures fell from a high of 42 percent in 2001 to a projected 33 
percent in 2004.lxix   
 Of worldwide capital investment in leading edge semiconductor manufacturing 
capacity—300-mm wafer fabrication plants—the U.S. share fell to 20 percent in 
2004, from 35 percent in 1999.  Never before had less than 25 percent of the 
world’s advanced fabrication capacity been located in the United States.lxx    
 The U.S. share of global semiconductor capacity has continued its descent, 
dropping to 17 percent in 2007, and 14 percent in 2009, falling to fourth place in 
the world.  Japan was the largest (with 25 percent of world capacity), followed 
by Taiwan (with 18 percent, up from 11 percent in 2001), and Korea (17 
percent, up from 11 percent in 2001).lxxi   
 Manufacturing & Technology News reported that in 2009, out of 16 
semiconductor fabrication facilities (“fabs”) under construction throughout the 
world, only one was being built in the United States.  It noted that 7 fabs under 
construction elsewhere in the world will produce light-emitting diodes, one of 
the most promising energy-saving technologies developed in the past 50 years. 
lxxii   
 The United States leads the world in fab closures.  Out of 27 fabs closed 
worldwide in 2009, 15 are in the United States, 4 each in Europe and Japan,  2 in 
China, and one each in Korea and Southeast Asia.  The United States led the 
world in closures (4 out of 15) in the prior year, as well. lxxiii   
In December 2009, the Bureau of Labor Statistics forecasted that the U.S. 
semiconductor manufacturing sector will lose 146,000 jobs, a decline of 34 percent, 
over the coming decade.lxxiv 
 
Offshoring and globalization.  Driving these losses has been the growing 
migration (i.e., offshoring) of critical microelectronic manufacturing capabilities to 
low-cost foreign locations, a practice which many observers warn will result in a 
loss of “trusted” and “assured” supplies of high-performance microchips used in 
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critical military and infrastructure applications.  The primary beneficiaries of these 
movements are Taiwan, Singapore, China, Korea, and Japan, which have been 
increasingly challenging U.S. technological leadership.   
 
First, U.S. semiconductor manufacturers moved their assembly, testing and 
packaging operations to Asia in the 1960s to the 1980s.   Then, in the 1980s and 
1990s, U.S. companies shifted fabrication abroad, contracting with offshore 
fabrication plants in Taiwan, China, Malaysia, and the Philippines to produce 
semiconductor wafers from designs created in the United States.lxxv  The DSB links 
the decline in investment in U.S. semiconductor manufacturing to the accelerating 
evolution toward vertical disaggregation in the semiconductor business, 
accompanied by firms outsourcing virtually all manufacturing operations, including 
chip fabrication, assembly, testing, and process development.  That is, U.S. firms 
developed global supply chains for sourcing different parts of the semiconductor 
production process over multiple locations around the world.  As a result, critical 
semiconductor manufacturing operations have been removed from U.S. national 
control.lxxvi 
 
The rapidly rising cost of building semiconductor fabrication factories—now 3-5 
billion USD per facility, with some even costing upwards of 8 billion USD,lxxvii for a 
full-scale, 300 mm wafer, 65 nm process chip fabrication plant—and the pressures 
of economies of scale spurred the formation of huge, specialized wafer processing 
facilities or foundries that accept business from all qualified customers in the broad 
industry base.  Foundries have been especially important for the new fabless chip 
companies that lack in-house manufacturing capacity.  Faced with the successful 
growth of the fabless/foundry model of semiconductor production, the traditional 
chip firms are steadily being forced to follow suit to become “fab-light.”lxxviii  The 
result is the rise of “fabless” integrated circuit production that grew to 16 percent of 
the overall industry by 2005, a proportion that is expected to rise over the next 10 
years.lxxix   
 
Semiconductor firms from the United States and other developed nations have 
continued their control of design, while contracting out to overseas foundries to 
perform the capital-intensive wafer fabrication.   Consequently, Asian countries, 
especially Taiwan and China, have increased their share of overall production, 
expanding their roles as major suppliers of fabrication services.   In recent years, 
however, some U.S. firms—in part to maintain close contact with Asian customers in 
order to meet their specific needs—have been offshoring complex semiconductor 
fabrication and design services, essentially moving up the value chain, as Taiwan 
and other foreign fabricators have become more adept at producing more complex 
semiconductors.lxxx  
 
Industry and government officials are increasingly concerned about similar trends 
in industries that support integrated circuit fabrication, such as photomask 
production.  Photomasks are a fundamental building block of semiconductor 
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manufacturing.lxxxi  The domestic photomask industry is reportedly being 
threatened by the rising complexity and cost of developing the next generation of 
microchips, and the relentless efforts by foreign governments, especially Japan, to 
establish their own capacity in this field.lxxxii 
 
A U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report noted two consequences of 
the shift in production and trade flows towards Asia.  First, because “final 
production increasingly takes place in Asia, the United States is importing an 
increasing share of electronics and telecommunications products (that use 
semiconductors).”  This is reflected in the growing U.S. trade deficit with Asia, and 
China in particular, including advanced technology products.  Second, “as electronics 
and telecommunications production chains increasingly locate in Asia, there are 
benefits to U.S. producers of semiconductors to locate abroad near their customers 
and take advantage of the production clusters developing there.”  As a result, there 
is a further incentive for U.S. firms to offshore their activities.lxxxiii  
 
China’s emergence in semiconductors.  Although Taiwan has traditionally 
dominated global foundry production, China, a relatively new entrant in global 
semiconductor fabrication, has rapidly increased its market share.  China still lags 
behind the United States and other Asian and European nations in semiconductor 
manufacturing capacity, but industry and defense officials have become increasingly 
concerned about China’s rapid development in this area because of its military-
industrial potential.lxxxiv  China emerged as an important new source of fabrication 
services in the late 1990s.  It has since been especially energetic in making 
semiconductor manufacturing a national priority and is particularly effective in 
attracting the latest generation of semiconductor fabrication plants. through 
preferential tax treatment, use of technology standards to favor domestic firms, and 
government support for R&D.lxxxv    
 
Although China entered the global semiconductor industry at the low end of the 
foundry business, Chinese foundries have made rapid progress.lxxxvi  Spencer 
reported that in September 2002, only four or five wafer foundries were proposed 
or underway in the United States.  In contrast, four fabs were operating in mainland 
China, one was under construction, and ten others were planned.  By 2006, China 
reportedly accounted for 70 percent of the semiconductor designing market in the 
Asia-Pacific region.lxxxvii  In 2009, China led the world in new semiconductor factory 
construction with six fabs, followed by Taiwan with five, and Korea, Japan, the 
European Union, and Southeast Asia, with one apiece.lxxxviii 
 
National security concerns.  The semiconductor industry exemplifies the 
problems for meeting critical U.S. national security needs created by the 
globalization of a key industrial sector, even though defense applications account for 
only a small fraction of that industry’s business.    
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 The capacity of U.S. foundries to meet the DOD’s integrated circuits needs is 
limited and diminishing.  Most of the 16 U.S. foundries are special-purpose, 
devoted to memory or microprocessor production, and not suitable to meet 
government ASIClxxxix needs.  In 2005, only one, and no more than three, of the 
U.S. fabs were accessible to the DOD to produce “trusted” microelectronics.xc    
 Dependence on off-shore or foreign-owned semiconductor components can 
threaten the United States with loss of its access to state-of-the-art 
microelectronics in times of war, when quick response and surge capacity are 
necessary.  This vulnerability results specifically from the concentration of the 
foundry industry into a few Far Eastern countries, one of which, China, could 
become a military adversary. 
 Natural disasters pose another potential threat to U.S. supply.  The devastating 
earthquake that hit Taiwan in 1999 shut down all factories in Hsinchu, the 
national wafer fabrication center.  Although these plants restarted in a matter of 
weeks, the DSB warned that “a temblor that seriously damaged Taiwan’s wafer 
capacity would have started a worldwide run on commercial wafer capacity that 
would have taken years to rectify.  During such a time, DOD and its contractors 
would have little leverage to obtain needed fabrication services.”xci 
 A potential threat to the security of classified information embedded in chip 
designs can arise from the shift from U.S. to foreign IC manufacturing.  This shift 
increases the possibility that “Trojan horses” and other unauthorized design 
inclusions, such as viruses and worms, may appear in unclassified ICs used in 
military applications.xcii 
 The DSB is worried about the broad loss of national technology leadership that 
would accompany the migration of semiconductor fabrication offshore, while 
foreign technology capabilities begin to catch up to, if not leap-frog, U.S. 
capabilities in this sector.  Lags in U.S. firms accessing leading-edge technology 
(as happened in the 1980s with Japanese advanced lithography tools) slow the 
time to market for U.S. advanced technologies.  “Loss of leadership in critical 
advanced microelectronics technologies,” the DSB stated, “would slow the entire 
commercial and defense product development process.”xciii   
 
ii. Printed Circuit Boards   
Outside of semiconductors, the printed circuit boards (PCBs) industry may be the 
most important domestic electronics sector experiencing serious erosion. PCBs 
connect a variety of active components (microchips and transistors) and passive 
components (capacitors and fuses) into electronic assemblies that control systems.  
They and other printed circuitry are critical elements of commercial and defense 
systems.  Indeed, they represent many of the most important aspects of the design 
of electronics products and assemblies.   
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A National Research Council (NRC) report has noted that the effectiveness of 
defense systems depends on the underlying PCB technology.  Because the military is 
increasingly reliant on networked operations, “these applications will expand for 
the foreseeable future, and the use of and requirements for PCBs will continue to 
grow.”  However, while commercial components can meet many of these 
requirements, “significant defense needs will be met only by the production of 
specialized, defense-specific PCBs that are unavailable from commercial 
manufacturers.”xciv   At the same time, the report observed, companies that serve 
U.S. military requirements will need a direct connection to the technology 
advancements of the global PCB industry to maintain their performance over the 
long run.  Unfortunately, DOD purchases from military suppliers will not be 
sufficiently large to create that linkage.  As a result, the report concluded, “the loss of 
this industry in the United States may adversely affect the remaining companies to 
supply future military needs.”xcv 
 
 Declining capacity.  The U.S. PCB industry has seen dramatic erosion in its 
domestic production capacity and position in global PCB markets over the last 
decade.  As the NRC study concluded, “by a number of measures, the PCB industry is 
in a steep decline,” and the remaining “U.S. companies may not be able to stay 
competitive in this high-technology area.”  Moreover, without outside support, it 
warned, PCB suppliers “will not be able to meet the requirements of U.S.-
manufactured [PCBs] for government and military applications.”xcvi   
 
In 2004, there were only about 400 PCB manufacturers left in the United States of 
which only 20 were capable of making military boards, and the industry continued 
to deteriorate over the remainder of the decade.   By 2009, there were only 300 U.S.-
based PCB shops.  The industry’s revenues have also fallen dramatically, from 11 
billion USD in 2000 to 4 USD billion in 2008.xcvii  According to one source, the U.S. 
PCB industry has shrunk 74 percent since 2000.xcviii  
  
Webber’s study concluded that the two main divisions in the PCB industry, bare 
printed circuit board manufacturing (NAICS 334412) and the printed circuit 
assembly industry (NAICS 334418) are eroding industries.  The bare printed circuit 
board industry includes companies that primarily manufacture rigid and flexible 
printed circuit boards without mounted electronic components. Webber reported 
that all three indicators examined in his study showed signs of severe erosion in this 
industry with little indication of recovery.  For example: 
 Employment dropped more than two-thirds from 150,000 in 2001 to less than 
50,000 in August 2008; 
 Share of GDP decreased by 50 percent between 2000-2006; and  
 The number of establishments of all sizes fell more than 40 percent between 
2001 and 2008,xcix including, according to BLS data, a sizable share of mid-sized 
plants (50-499 employees) and large plants (500 or more employees).c 
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The printed circuit assembly industry includes firms that load components onto 
printed circuit boards, producing printed circuit assemblies, electronic assemblies 
and modules.  Webber noted that his indicators show a confusing mixture of results, 
though a closer look suggests more consistency than apparent on the surface.  Both 
employment and industry GDP fell:   
 Employment dropped nearly 20 percent between 2001 and August 2008—from 
67,000 to about 54,000, just above employment levels at the end of the 1991 
recession;  
 GDP dropped approximately 50 percent from 16 billion USD in 2000, to about 7 
billion USD in 2006;   
 Although the number of establishments steadily grew by 270 from 2001 to 2008.  
However, drawing on BLS establishment data, it is likely this gain was mostly due to 
growth in the number of small shops of under 50 employees, while medium- and 
large-sized plants probably followed the same pattern of loss as during the first half 
of the decade.   For example, the PCB assembly industry lost 23, or 10 percent of 
mid-sized plants, along with 5,400 jobs, and 8, or nearly half of large plants with 500 
or more employees each, along with a total net loss of nearly 10,300 workers.  A net 
total of nearly 12,800 jobs, one-fifth the sector’s workforce, were lost in this period, 
entirely due to the shuttering of mid- and large-sized plants.ci   
 
This trend tracks with the large-scale closure or movement offshore of large PCB 
plants in both industry segments, in the United States over the last decade.  As an 
industry insider laments, what remains are mostly “shops,” which are “owner 
operated and employ themselves.  They are small.  They barely survive.  They 
cannot invest.  Most offer only small lot, quick-turn delivery.  There is very little 
R&D if any at all.  They can’t afford equipment.  They are stale.”cii 
 
 Globalization and offshoring.  The primary causes of this sector’s malaise 
are the offshore movement of not only PCB production, but also of PCB-consuming 
industries.  The NRC report attributed the movement of interconnection technology 
(PCB) manufacturing capacity overseas to globalization of the electronics industry.  
“The intense competition in the face of this increasing globalization,” the report 
argued, “currently challenges U.S. manufacturers and leaves many U.S. firms unable 
to raise prices to keep pace with rising production costs.”  In addition, lacking a 
technology innovation base in this sector, these firms will be unable to increase 
their productivity.  The report observed that PCBs are intermediate products, not 
end products.  Consequently, the location of their customers matters.  Not only are 
U.S. PCB manufacturers losing domestic markets, they must find global markets, 
which could be difficult to compete in because they are insular with respect to U.S. 
producers.  It concluded, that for PCB companies to be successful, they “must follow 
their markets offshore, which eventually could leave a base too small to support U.S. 
defense needs.”ciii  
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Analysts agree that exactly how much of this industry has been lost remains 
conjecture.  But most also agree that by 2005, between forty and fifty percent of 
North America’s PCB orders have migrated offshore.civ  At the same time, between 
1997 and 2007, imports’ share of the U.S. domestic consumption of the bare printed 
circuit board and printed board assembly industries have grown steadily.  The 
import penetration rate for the printed circuit boards industry increased by nearly 
half, from 24 percent to 35 percent, between 1997 to 2007.  Printed circuit board 
assembly imports rose from 37 percent to 47 percent, an increase of more than a 
quarter, over the same period.cv  
 
Parts and materials suppliers to the PCB industry are suffering similar problems.  
For example, by 2004, industry leaders were already concerned that the U.S. 
laminates industry, which forms the basic underpinnings of all electronics, will soon 
be lost.  Doug Bartlett, chairman of Bartlett Manufacturing Co., Cary, IL (the nation’s 
oldest PCB company until it closed in 2009), noted in 2004, that ten years earlier 
there were ten major U.S. producers of rigid laminate used by the PCB industry, and 
U.S. firms dominated the market.  By the end of 2004, he predicted, virtually all rigid 
laminate will be imported from Asia.cvi  Similarly, the industry relies on foreign 
sources for drill bits, imaging materials, specialty chemicals, film and capital 
equipment, whose production has largely disappeared from U.S. shores.cvii  
 
 Loss of global leadership.  Once dominating global PCB production, the 
United States has lost its leadership, especially to Asian nations: 
 The U.S. share of global PCB revenues fell from 42 percent in 1984, to only about 
30 percent in 1998, to less than 8 percent in 2008.   
 Although in 2000 the United States was still second only to Japan in PCB 
production—the latter had 28 percent of world output, the former 26 percentcviii 
—by 2009, Asia’s share had grown to 80 percent, up from 33 percent a decade 
ago.cix 
 By 2003, while Japan’s top ten PCB producers continued to dominate the market, 
with 29 percent of the global market share, the United States had fallen behind 
China—the latter’s top 10 controlled 17 percent of the global market while the 
U.S. top ten had only 15 percent.cx   
 By 2007, China/Hong Kong had moved to the top, accounting for 28 percent of 
worldwide PCB output, followed by Japan, Taiwan and Korea—the United States 
was a distant fifth.cxi  
 
According to the Chinese Printed Circuit Association, by 2005, it had become the 
world’s second largest PCB producer, after Japan, and was a dominant player on the 
world stage.  Asia’s growth as a whole in PCB manufacturing was explosive, with 
China alone accounting for almost a quarter of the global production of rigid and 
flexible circuits.cxii  According to one source, in 2005, China was already home to 
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about 1,000 PCB companies that produced a combined annual revenue of 8 billion 
USD in rigid board production, half of which is exported.cxiii  Lamenting his own 
firm’s loss of over half its annual sales between 2000 and 2003, Bartlett has claimed 
that Chinese companies were able to produce comparable products for half the 
price.  Blaming Chinese government subsidies and predatory trade practices, he 
argued that Chinese-subsidized rigid laminate suppliers were similarly undercutting 
the competitiveness of U.S. producers such as Westinghouse, GE, and Norplex.”cxiv 
 
 National security concerns.  The loss of the domestic PCB industry to 
foreign producers presents concerns similar to those posed by the threatened loss 
of U.S. microelectronics capacity.  The NRC report concluded that “the continued 
dissipation of downstream electronic systems components manufactured in the 
United States inevitably means that the Department of Defense will have less access 
to and availability of leading-edge electronic subsystem technology including PrCBs, 
microchips, and displays.”cxv  
 
As the underpinning of nearly all electronics systems, PCBs are critical technologies 
for numerous military applications.  For example, U.S. companies making PCBs used 
in sonabuoys employed to detect submarines are going out of business.cxvi  The 
Trojan horses threat presented by foreign microprocessor manufacturing could 
emerge, too, as overseas companies could sabotage military electronics by 
clandestinely placing hard-to-detect defects in circuit boards.cxvii  Bartlett argues 
that it “does not make sense to have Chinese build productions that go into the 
products of our national defense.  The implications for national defense and 
homeland security should be obvious.”cxviii  He also predicted that within five years, 
the domestic PCB industry “would not be able to meet the advancing needs of the 
military in a volume sufficient for national defense and homeland security.”cxix 
 
By 2006, the Pentagon appeared to awaken to the problems of assuring a secure 
supply of electronics products, including printed circuit boards (and printed circuit 
board mounted components) that meet its specialized, defense-unique 
requirements, when most of the nation’s electronics manufacturing capacity has 
moved offshore.  A task force comprised of representatives from 10 military 
agencies, the National Security Agency, and the State Department, agreed with the 
NRC report, calling for a program aimed at creating a “trusted” supply of printed 
circuit boards.  In a report to Congress in July 2006, it recommended that PCBs be 
included in the “Defense Trusted Integrated Circuit Strategy,” a program set up to 
deal with the shift of high-tech production overseas.  It noted that while “[e]nsuring 
a supply of trusted integrated circuits is necessary,” it would not be “sufficient to 
remove risks and vulnerabilities associated with populated printed circuit 
assemblies.”  Therefore, including PCBs into the Trusted Strategy program “could 
mitigate the risks posed by tampering and counterfeiting . . .While the DOD has not 
experienced specific disruptions to date, the globalization trend beginning in the 
1990s has increased this vulnerability.”cxx   
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Today, few, if any, defense-specific components that meet increasingly sophisticated 
DOD requirements can be provided by domestic high-volume, low-cost, commercial 
PCB suppliers of components used in commercial durable goods (such as 
automobiles, appliances, heavy equipment).cxxi  However, even some analysts in the 
defense electronics community are skeptical that the DOD’s “trusted” approach will 
be sufficient.  They view it as a stop-gap—“putting a Band-Aid on a bullet hole,” as 
described by some.  But, as Gary Powell, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for 
Industrial Policy in the Bush Administration, acknowledged a defense unique 
solution to the electronics supply chain problem would be insufficient to address 
this problem.  “We have to figure out what’s really important from a system level,” 
he argued, “and make sure those [things] have an adequate level of protection and 
for less importance systems, we have to rely more extensively on commercial best 
practices.”cxxii  
 
iii. Machine Tools  
Machine tools are the principal devices used to cut and form metal. A part of 
machinery manufacturing (NAICS 333) and the metalworking machinery 
manufacturing subsector (NAICS 33351), machine tools manufacturing includes two 
industries: metal-cutting machine tool manufacturing (NAICS 333512) and metal-
forming machine tool manufacturing (NAICS 333514).  The former comprises 
establishments engaged in manufacturing metal cutting machine tools, including 
lathes, mills and CNC machines.  The latter includes establishments engaged in 
producing metal forming machine tools, such as punching, sheering, bending, 
forming, pressing, forging, and die-casting machines.   
 
Machine tools are employed in nearly all manufacturing involving metals, from 
automobiles to airplanes to ball bearings.  Because of their importance in producing 
weapons systems and other military products, the United States imposes export 
controls on machine tools and supporting systems.  Indeed, efforts to control the 
exports and imports of machine tools reflect the perception that manufacturing 
technology may often be more important than the products of that technology.cxxiii   
 
Because each subsector provides a fundamental capability in the innovation 
process—the creation of prototypes and finished products—Webber considers 
them, along with industrial molds and semiconductor machinery, among the most 
critical industries in the defense industrial support base.  Metal cutting machine 
tools, he observes, “have a profound impact on the ability to create more 
sophisticated components out of a wider range of materials,” and allow “for the 
manufacture of different designs,” thereby “enhancing greater innovation up the 
supply chain.”  Similarly, metal forming machinery (such as metal presses) has 
allowed the creation of “more sophisticated components over a wider range of sizes 
and from more diverse materials.”cxxiv  
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Declining capacity.  By most measures, the U.S. machine tool industry has 
been in a steep decline for over a decade.  In Webber’s study, the metal-cutting and 
metal-forming machine tool industries showed clear signs of erosion.  Employment 
and establishment numbers fell sharply in both cases, and industry GDP fell from 
1998 until 2002 for both industries, though the metal cutting subsector showed 
modest signs of recovery through 2007.  Two related industries, industrial mold 
manufacturing (NAICS 333511) and special die and tool, die set, jig, and fixture 
manufacturing (NAICS 333514), that Webber examines, showed even more severe 
signs of erosion.cxxv  Drawing on BLS employment and establishment data, the 
machine tool industry’s downward trajectory is clearly apparent: 
 The metal cutting machine tool industry shed 16 percent of its establishments, 
and lost over 8,000 jobs, or 22 percent of its workforce, between 2001 and 2008; 
as the recession took off, it lost another 5,000 jobs in the first 6 months of 2009 
alone, for a total employment loss of 40 percent over the decade; 
 The metal forming machine tool industry lost 17 percent of its establishments 
and over 2,200 jobs, or 14 percent of its workforce, between 2001 and 2008; 
another 2,700 jobs were lost the first six months of June 2009, a total decline in 
the industry’s workforce of 31 percent from its 2001 level.cxxvi 
 
In terms of U.S. consumption and production, the machine tool industry suffered a 
steep five-year decline starting in 1998, and then showed signs of a very modest 
rebound starting in the mid-2000s up through 2008—though it never attained the 
high levels it enjoyed over the previous decade (see figures 17a and 17b):cxxvii   
 Reflecting the recession at the beginning of the decade, the U.S. market for 
machine tools shrank by more than half between 1998 and 2002, from a record 
8.7 billion USD down to 3.8 billion USD. 
 U.S. machine tool shipments were also cut by more than half, from 4.4 billion 
USD in 1999 to a low of 2.2 billion USD in 2003.  In constant dollars, this 
represented the lowest level of machine tool shipments since industry data 
tracking began in the 1920s.cxxviii   
 By 2008, U.S. machine tool consumption was still close to 40 percent below its 
1998 level (in constant dollars), and U.S. machine tool production was over 30 
percent lower than in 1999.   
 Even worse, in 2009, as the recession hit, the domestic machine tool industry 
went into a freefall.   April 2009 machine tool sales were 78 percent lower than 
the same month the year before, and year-to-date consumption was down 71 
percent compared to 2008.cxxix 
 
 International comparisons.  As shown by figures 17a and 17b, and the 
following trends, the U.S. machine tool industry increasingly lags in both 
consumption and production behind foreign competitors, notably China, Japan and 
Germany: 
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 Once the world leader in machine tool consumption,cxxx the United States had 
fallen to fourth (behind China, Japan, and Germany) by 2004, where it current 
remains—though Italy is not far behind; 
 China surged into the top spot in machine tool consumption in 2002, reflecting 
the robust expansion of its advanced manufacturing sector; although China’s 
economy is only about one-tenth the size of the United States’. In 2004, the 
Chinese machine tool market set a new world record with purchases of 9.26 
billion USD, nearly twice that of the United States, and one-and-a-half times that 
of Japan;cxxxi   
 By 2008, even though U.S. consumption had rebounded, it was almost 20 percent 
smaller than that of Japan, and one-third that of China; 
 In 2000, the United States was the world’s third largest producer of machine 
tools (behind Japan and Germany), but by 2004 it had fallen to sixth place 
(behind Japan, Germany, China, Italy, and Taiwan) and by 2008, it was seventh 
(after Korea); 
 In 2008, Japan (15.85 billion USD) and Germany (15.66 billion USD) each 
produced an estimated four times, and China (13.97 billion USD), 3½ times, the 
worth of machine tools made in the United States (3.79 billion USD).cxxxii 
Although the top five consumer nations’ share of world consumption and world 
production remained the same between 2000 and 2008, at around 71 percent, and 
61 percent, respectively, the United States had lost ground in both categories in that 
time period (see figures 17a and 17b): 
 In 2000, it led with 19 percent of global machine tool purchases—followed by 
Germany (15 percent) and China (10 percent)—but by 2008, it had fallen behind 
China (24 percent), Germany (12 percent), and Japan (10 percent, with only 8 
percent of global consumption; 
 Similarly, in 2000, the United States accounted for the third largest share of 
world machine tool production (11 percent), behind Japan (24 percent) and 
Germany (20 percent)—but ahead of China (6 percent); by 2008, its share of 
world output was only 6 percent, compared to 19 percent each for Japan and 
Germany, and 17 percent for China.cxxxiii 
 
 Globalization and import penetration.  The same countries as listed above are 
eating away at the U.S. share of its own domestic machine tool market.  The United 
States has long been the leading importer of machine tools in the world, but in past 
decades that reflected robust growth in manufacturing overseas.   In the 2000s, the 
U.S. remained one of the world’s top two importers of machine tools—it was 
surpassed by China early in the decade, but the import share of domestic 
consumption grew steadily, even as its consumption and production declined.   
 
In 1996, the United States was the number one importer, and sixth largest exporter 
in the world, and imports accounted for 53 percent of the value of machine tools 
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consumed.  By 2000, the import share of U.S. machine tool consumption had grown 
to 61 percent and it continued to grow throughout the decade, rising to 72 percent 
in 2008.  That is, only one in four machine tools purchased in the United States was 
domestically made.  Similarly, according to the USBIC, from 1997 to 2007, the 
import penetration rate for metal-forming machine tools increased by 44 percent, 
from 62.7 percent to 90.6 percent, and that for metal-cutting machine tools 
increased by 11 percent, from 58.6 percent to 64.9 percent.cxxxiv 
 
In testimony to the USCC in 2005, Dr. Paul Freedenberg, Vice President of the 
Association for Manufacturing Technology, observed that the decline of the 
domestic machine tool industry directly reflects decline in the broader U.S. 
manufacturing sector.  Machine tool companies’ industrial customers were 
disappearing, either closing down or moving to other countries—often China.  
Further, he claimed, many companies are “unwilling to make new investments in 
sophisticated and productive equipment that is necessary to remain competitive in 
today’s manufacturing marketplace, because of the uncertainty concerning the 
future of manufacturing in the United States.” cxxxv 
 
According to Freedenberg, foreign penetration of the U.S. machine tool market had 
risen from about 30 percent in 1983 to more than 70 percent in 2004.  Between 
1998 and 2002 alone, import penetration increased by 15 percent, which 
Freedenberg attributed to the “diminished market abroad [at that time] and fierce 
competition for one of the last open machine tool markets in the world.”cxxxvi   
 
China’s emergence.  China has made both major quantitative and qualitative 
progress in machine tool production.  Companies in China and Taiwan have caught 
up to U.S. firms in technical capabilities, and foreign rivals have been purchasing U.S. 
firms.  Until recently, China could produce only relatively simple machines, and 
purchased largely unsophisticated equipment.  Japanese and Western suppliers 
were the sources for most of their sophisticated equipment needs.cxxxvii  Today, 
however, China is buying state-of-the-art, computer-controlled machine tools with 
greater precision and durability, and its domestic factories are producing 
increasingly sophisticated equipment.cxxxviii  In his USCC testimony, Freedenberg, 
predicted that “within five years the Chinese will be ready to compete in world 
markets” for cutting-edge machine tools. 
 
In fact, China has been successful in building up its capacity in advanced machine 
tools, including in the production and use of five-axis machines (see Box B). It makes 
24 distinct models.  China is supplying most of its demand for the five-axis models, 
including those used by its military, and depends on only 10 percent from 
import.cxxxix  It also has 28 companies capable of making over 1000 CNC machine 
tools per year, and over 130 companies with an annual capacity of more than 100 
machine tools.  In the first eleven months of 2009, China made 139,000 CNC 
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machine tools including 125,000 for metal cutting and 9,628 for metal forming—a 
number that was expected to rise to 150,000 by the end of the year.cxl 
 
 
Figure 17a 
Machine Tool Consumption—U.S., Japan, Germany and China 
 
Figure 17b 
Machine Tool Production—U.S., Japan, Germany and China 
 
 
High Road Strategies 
High Road Strategies 
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National security concerns.  The critical importance of machine tools to 
maintaining defense industrial capabilities is widely recognized.  The significant 
erosion of the U.S. machine tool industry, however, could seriously damage the 
domestic manufacturing base that supports the U.S. defense industry.  In times of 
emergency, the manufacturing capacity to build weapons systems will have to be 
squeezed out of existing capacity, imported, or produced off-shore.  Freedenberg 
observed that DOD’s warfighting plan “does not seem to anticipate the threat of 
disrupted supply lines, a concern that existed during the Reagan Administration and 
was an integral part of all previous administrations’ war planning.”cxli  
 
 
Box B—FIVE-AXIS MACHINE TOOLS 
 
The U.S. loss of competitiveness in the five-axis machine tool market exemplifies the 
serious deterioration in this sector.  Five-axis machine tools are some of the most 
technologically advanced machine tools.  They are used in the production of precision 
components in aerospace, gas and diesel engines, and automobile parts, and are used 
throughout the medical, textile, oil, glass, heavy industrial equipment and tool 
industries.  About half of all commercial five-axis machines in the United States are 
purchased for government contracts, and the majority of these purchases are used 
solely for government work.    
 
According to a study by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS), U.S. producers’ sales of five-axis machine tools fell by 11 percent, from 284 million 
USD to 253 million USD between 2005 and 2008, before the financial and economic 
meltdown in 2009, when domestic consumption tumbled by 60.4 percent.  Sales to 
domestic customers dropped by 19 percent from 2005 to 2008, corresponding with a 
precipitous decline of 20 percent in domestic sales among U.S. manufacturers over the 
same period.cxlii     
 
According to BIS, there are only six remaining U.S. companies dedicated to five-axis 
machines, compared to at least 20 in China and 22 in Taiwan.  The remaining machine 
tool firms have either shifted their production to other machine tool lines, or have 
moved offshore.  Between 2005 and 2008, 80 percent of all five-axis machines sold in 
the United States were imported, the majority from Japan and Germany.cxliii 
 
 
Ironically, efforts to argue against requiring U.S. content in defense goods further 
illustrate the deterioration in the ability of the domestic machine tool industry to 
meet defense needs.  For example, the White House argued in 2003 that a bill 
introduced by U.S. Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA), requiring that the U.S. 
content in defense goods rise from 50 percent to 60 percent, and that four years 
after enactment, all machine tools in U.S. defense programs be 100 percent 
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American made, had “the potential to degrade U.S. military capabilities” and more 
specifically would “unnecessarily restrict the Department of Defense’s ability to 
access non-U.S. state-of-the-art technologies and industrial capabilities.”cxliv   
Similarly, aerospace industry representatives have argued that, “Plant floors across 
the industry would need to be retrofitted at huge cost,” in order to meet U.S. military 
needs. The Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) further estimated that “foreign 
machine tools and components represent at least 30 percent to 40 percent of the 
value of defense industry machine tools” and endorsed Boeing Corp.’s judgment that 
the market-share gains made by foreign tools was owed to “greater accuracy, higher 
technology, and better reliability of foreign equipment.”  In all, according to the AIA: 
 
DOD’s assessment of the capacity of the machine tool industrial base finds that it 
would take well into the next decade to produce the required replacement tools 
There are many cases where American tools do not currently exist and new 
production lines would have to be built to produce them. U.S. machine tool builders 
currently have neither the ability nor capacity to meet an increased demand . . . It 
will take at least ten years to make the American machine tool industry viable again, 
especially in the ultra-precision market in which America does not participate.cxlv   
 
iv. Advanced Materials   
Advanced materials are included in the U.S. Census Bureau’s Advanced Technology 
Products (ATP) trade statistics.  The advanced materials industry “[e]ncompasses 
recent advances in the development of materials that allow for further development 
and application of other advanced technologies.  Examples are semiconductor 
materials, optical fiber cable and video discs.”cxlvi  A 2005 National Research Council 
study, which examined the globalization of materials R&D, similarly identified a 
range of materials science and engineering subfields as the most important to 
advanced manufacturing, and thereby to national security.cxlvii  These include 
biomaterials; ceramics; composites; magnetic materials; metals; electronic and 
optical-photonic materials; superconducting materials; polymers; catalysts; and 
nanomaterials.  In almost every one of these subsectors, there are important and 
often critical national security applications and products.  Webber did not include 
materials manufacturing in his study of the defense industrial support base, though 
he appreciated that “materials provide the foundation of the modern manufacturing 
and defense industrial base,” and suggested that a separate study of the materials 
industries would be warranted.cxlviii  
 
Because materials industries are so technology intensive, keeping at the cutting-
edge in materials R&D is critical to the U.S. remaining globally competitive in 
manufacturing.  In turn, the importance of materials competitiveness to national 
security should be self-evident.  In fact, military needs have long driven the 
development and application of new materials.  The Defense Department has unique 
demands for certain high-performance metals, ceramics, polymers, and composites.  
As the NRC study noted, “[m]eeting the defense needs of the country in the 21st 
century will rely on R&D in materials and processes to improve existing materials 
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and achieve breakthroughs in new materials and combinations.”  The NRC identified 
several specific materials applications important to warfighting capabilities: new 
lightweight materials with greater strength and functionality, materials that 
enhance protection and survivability, stealth materials, electronic and photonic 
materials for high-speed communications, sensor and actuator materials, high-
energy density materials, and materials that improve propulsion technology.cxlix  
 
Weakening global leadership.  The United States has long been—and 
remains—the world leader in most materials-related technologies, but during the 
first half of the 2000s decade the NRC warned that this leadership was eroding.  A 
review of the subfields identified by the NRC reveals that several are characterized 
by globalized manufacturing and R&D.  Moreover, the study added, “[w]hile the 
strength of these trends varies from one subfield to another, the trends themselves 
are clear and point to a loss in national capability in materials subfields of national 
importance.”cl  Among the NRC report’s main findings:  
 
 Domestic materials production is disappearing and moving offshore. Due to 
financial difficulties and foreign competition, businesses have consolidated in 
many, if not most, materials subsectors since 2000.  Plant capacity and 
employment have declined, and for a number of critical materials (specialty 
steels, advanced ceramics, and magnesium) production capabilities have been 
moving offshore.  
 Materials R&D and innovation is following production offshore.  The large-scale 
migration of materials producers and users has harmed domestic advanced 
materials R&D by inducing many U.S. companies to shift some of their materials 
science and engineering R&D overseas.  Many U.S. materials firms that have 
offshored R&D are also drawn to the growing availability of foreign intellectual 
resources, often available at lower costs, and by “the increasing availability of 
unique technologies not found in the United States.”cli  
 The margin of U.S. leadership in advanced materials R&D is eroding and 
increasingly challenged by other nations.  As U.S. companies cut back their R&D 
or move it offshore, other countries—in particular Japan, Germany, and other 
Asian states, including China, Korea and India—are actively supporting their 
own technological capabilities in materials fields important to commercial 
competitiveness and military needs.   These countries are investing heavily in 
their science and technology infrastructure, in science and engineering 
education, and in a variety of specific R&D initiatives.clii  
 
According to ATP trade data, advanced materials is a relatively small sector 
compared to the other ATP categories, with total combined exports and imports of 
4.4 billion USD in 2008, compared to 2.6 billion USD in 2002 (current year).  The 
sector has suffered consistent trade deficits throughout the decade, reflecting 
inroads made by foreign competitors into U.S. markets. The U.S. advanced materials 
industry has amassed a global trade deficit that jumped from 380 million USD to 
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774 million USD, essentially doubling, between 2002 and 2006 (see figure 18), 
before falling back to a little below the 2002 level in 2008 due to the recession.  
Despite the shift in the trade balance for advanced materials, both exports and 
imports also grew substantially, 74 percent and 54 percent, respectively.cliii 
 
By far, the largest U.S. advanced materials trade deficit was with Japan, whose 
imports into the United States grew steadily over the decade, more than doubling 
between 2002 and 2008, from 417 million USD to 948 million USD.  The United 
States also ran substantial, if somewhat smaller, advanced materials trade deficits 
with Mexico, Germany, France, and Finland throughout the decade, and until 2008, 
with China, and South Korea.  In contrast, the United States has enjoyed sizable 
advanced materials trade surpluses with Canada, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, 
Ireland, and the United Kingdom.cliv   
 
Figure 18 
U.S. Trade Balance in Advanced Materials 
 
 
The growth in exports to China, which until 2008 outpaced imports, most likely 
reflects China’s increasing appetite for advanced materials products that the nation 
currently lacks sufficient internal capacity to meet.  Indeed, a new report predicts 
that China’s market for advanced materials is expected to grow by 60.5 billion USD 
by 2012, a compound average annual growth rate of 14.7 percent. This includes 
applications of advanced non-metal materials, advanced metals and alloys, energy 
materials and nano-materials.  At the same time, China is aggressively seeking to 
develop its own technological and production capabilities in this area making the 
High Road Strategies Source: Census Bureau 
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development of advanced materials an important part of its national sustainable 
development strategy, with the goal of fostering competitiveness and furthering the 
state of the art for China’s industrial base.  A recent study shows that the Chinese 
government has placed advanced materials high on its development agenda for the 
next decade, and listed it as among the key high-tech industry sectors that should be 
given high-priority for development.clv    
 
Offshoring of materials R&D.   The NAS report reaffirmed the link between 
the offshoring of materials production and the offshoring of materials R&D.  The 
relationship between the two was vividly illuminated in testimony by Dr. Jack W. 
Schilling, Chairman of the Specialty Steel Industry of North America (SSINA) and 
Chief Technical officer of Allegheny Technologies Inc. to the USCC: 
It is very important to understand that technology development travels with 
the manufacturing process.  Our plants in the specialty metals industry are 
our laboratories.  It is thus naïve to think that manufacturing of these 
materials could be transferred to China while technology development is 
kept here in the U.S.”clvi  
 
Section IV presents a number of examples demonstrating the manufacturing-R&D 
linkage in multiple industrial sectors, included advanced materials.  The following 
are additional examples of major materials technologies illustrating how the 
migration of R&D to follow manufacturing offshore has weakened U.S. capabilities 
vital to national security. 
 
Night-vision systems.  Night vision systems enable soldiers and airman to see, 
identify and track targets at night, in low-visibility weather conditions and through 
fog and mist – “to own the night.”clvii   They give the United States a major military 
advantage in sea, air and ground environments.  In Congressional testimony in 
2003, Siva Sivananthan, inventor of mercury cadmium telluride (MCT) 
semiconductors used in night vision devices, maintained that the U.S. military was 
almost entirely dependent on foreign sources of materials, components and 
production of night-vision infrared devices.  He also claimed that outsourcing was 
primarily responsible for the complete absence of U.S. suppliers of substrates for 
molecular-beam epitaxy-grown MCT devices.  clviii   
 
At that time, he asserted that a company in Japan is the world’s only source of these 
crucial materials.  Only three small companies are involved in the infrared material 
field and four small firms make components, he said.  Most U.S. suppliers to the 
military have gone out of business.  In addition, night vision research has 
disappeared almost entirely from the United States.  In 1988, eight universities 
performed research in this area. In 2008, only the University of Illinois-Chicago 
remained active.  Meanwhile, China, India, France, Israel, Germany and the United 
Kingdom have invested heavily in developing new night vision systems and 
technologies, and in developing markets outside the United States.clix 
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 Rare-earth magnets.  Lanthanides, or rare-earth elements, boast functional 
properties essential for permanent magnets, sensors, telecommunications, 
electronics, and many other key defense applications.  For example, neodymium-
ion-born magnets are used in servomechanisms for guided missiles and smart 
bombs.  Magnetic materials research had become important to the field over first 
half of the 2000s decade for a wide range of commercial, medical and defense 
applications.  Permanent magnets are available from only a few sources in the 
United States.  By offering lower priced materials, and improved quality, however, 
Chinese firms have replaced U.S. suppliers (see Box C).clx  This reflects the Chinese 
government’s strategy for cornering the market for rare-earth elements, the raw 
material for this industry, as described in the USCC’s 2005 Annual Report.clxi    
 
 
Box C—THE MAGNAQUENCH STORY 
 
In 1995, two Chinese firms, San Huan New Materials and China Non-ferrous Materials 
Corporation, partnered with U.S. investors, purchased Indiana-based Magnaquench 
from parent company General Motors, one of the few remaining U.S. rare earth magnet 
producers.  Magnaquench had produced rare earth magnets and magnet powders used 
in hard drives, consumer electronics and guidance systems.  Concerned about the 
military uses of the magnets, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(CFIUS) reviewed the case.  It approved the acquisition based on a commitment that the 
company’s Indiana plant would remain in the United States.  However, the investors 
backed out of that promise and the whole facility was eventually moved to China.clxii    
 
At that time, Magnaquench was the only U.S. manufacturer of rare-earth “neo” 
magnets, critical components in military smart bomb guidance systems.  Because of the 
decision to shut down Magnaquench’s U.S. production, the U.S. military has to buy 
“neo” magnets from China. Deals such as these around the world, the USCC notes, have 
enabled China to control the markets in rare-earth products.clxiii     In 2008
 U.S. Senator 
Evan Bayh (D-IN) protested the government’s decision to shut down the Indiana 
Magnaquench plant.  He complained that, “Not only did we compromise our national 
security interests, but we also lost more than 225 good-paying Hoosier jobs.”clxiv   
 
 
In response to the loss of U.S. capacity in the rare-earth magnets sector, U.S. Senator 
Evan Bayh (D-IN) supported language in the 2008 Department of Defense 
authorization bill to preserve and enhance the “specialty metals clause” that 
requires the U.S. military to purchase specialty metals used in defense systems 
solely from U.S. producers.  For example, it called for the military to purchase 
domestically produced “alnico” and other high performance magnets, so long as 
there are U.S. manufacturers who make them.  Bayh promoted this provision to 
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ensure the survival of companies such as high-performance magnet producer 
Thomas & Skinner of Indianapolis, IN.  Thomas & Skinner is one of only five 
producers left in the United States that makes “alnico” magnets, which are used in 
numerous defense and aerospace applications, including missiles, military fighters 
and other aircraft, ground transport vehicles and radar systems.clxv   
 
The 2009 USCC report to Congress warned that China now appeared to be 
tightening its control over the supply of rare-earth elements, through limits on the 
amount that can be exported in the last three years.  China already supplies the vast 
majority—93 percent—of the world’s production of rare earth minerals.  The 
tighter export limits place foreign manufacturers (including American producers) at 
a disadvantage compared to domestic Chinese manufacturers.clxvi 
 
 Specialty metals.  Specialty metals feature unique chemistries and high tech 
processes. They include stainless steels, superalloys and other nickel alloys, 
tinanium and titanium alloys, zirconium, and niobium alloys, and are used in a wide 
variety of industrial markets, including defense.  In a statement to the USCC, Jack 
Schilling of the SSINA touted the importance of specialty metals to virtually every 
U.S. military platform.  “Simply put,” he wrote, “weapons systems can neither be 
built nor operated without these materials,” including missiles, jet aircraft, 
submarines, helicopters, Humvees, and munitions.  Schilling added that most of 
these materials have been invented and developed by domestic specialty metals 
firms.  Leading-edge defense applications represent only less than 10 percent of 
overall sales of specialty metals companies, but the same equipment and same 
engineers working in the civilian side of these businesses are employed for these 
defense products as well. The health of U.S. specialty metals companies, therefore, 
“is very important to the defense related industrial base of the nation,” Schilling 
argued, as their commercial profits support their defense work.clxvii   
 
 
Box D—CHINA’S STAINLESS STEEL STRATEGY 
 
SSINA’s Schilling noted that Beijing has embarked on a “highly coordinated, systematic, 
strategic initiative” to acquire western technology, “which, left unchallenged, will result 
in the transfer of specialty metals technology in China.”clxviii  According to a SSINA 
analysis in 2007, China’s industrial strategies, such as providing “massive” subsidies, tax 
rebates, low-or no-interest loans or grants, and various import restrictions, to greatly 
boost the production outputs of key industries—beyond what can be consumed 
domestically—have been applied to the metallurgical sector which includes stainless 
steel.clxix    
 
As a result, China has grown to be the world’s largest producer of stainless steel—its 
output in 2006 grew by more than 60 percent (3 million tons).  It added 8 million tons of 
capacity over the previous two years alone, and has the capacity to make up to 12 
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million tons of stainless steel.  To put this in perspective, the U.S. consumption in 2006 
was only 2.6 million tons.   
 
The SSINA report noted that China was ramping up its capability to be a major exporter 
of stainless steel.  China’s stainless steel exports increased by 137 percent in 2006, to 
852,000 tons, and the government continues to approve new plants while foreign firms 
invest in new capacity in the country.   China has 20 new stainless steel and steel 
production plants that were expected to begin production in 2007 alone.  As a result, 
the SSINA report concluded, “The growth of the Chinese stainless steel to the point of 
excess capacity has been at the expense of its international competitors.”clxx   
 
 
Schilling, however, reported that although the domestic industry is currently 
profitable and remains the global leader in technology, North American suppliers 
face major new competitors in China, India and Russia.  The United States could lose 
its specialty metals industry, he warned, if companies reduce their domestic 
investment in manufacturing and technology and then move these activities 
offshore to improve their profitability (see Box D). He noted that today there are 
“fewer companies producing specialty steels in North America than at any time in 
the last fifty years.”  He goes on to say that the playing field has become 
“increasingly tilted in favor of moving production and technology offshore.”clxxi   
 
v. Aerospace 
Aerospace (NAICS 33641) is a core industrial sector fundamental to America’s 
economic and national security, and many consider it the technological backbone of 
the U.S. manufacturing base.clxxii Unlike the other industries examined above, 
national security and space agencies constitute a major, if not the largest, portion of 
the customer base for the aerospace sector.  Aerospace represents the largest 
downstream sector in the defense industrial base, encompassing the big systems 
integrator companies that oversee the design, construction and assembly of major 
systems and weapons platforms used for the nation’s defense (others include 
shipbuilding and automotive transport).  It includes a cluster of related but 
somewhat distinct industries, including aircraft, engines and parts, guided missiles, 
and space vehicles.  This profile will primarily focus on the largest segment in the 
sector by far—accounting for nearly 90 percent of total aerospace shipmentsclxxiii— 
the aircraft, engines and parts industries (NAICS 336411-3), which produce 
commercial jets, military aircraft, regional jets, and general aviation aircraft 
 
In addition, the aerospace sector depends on an extensive network of purchasers, 
subcontractors, suppliers and partners (the second, third, fourth tier contractors 
and beyond) comprising the sector’s supply chain, which provide parts and 
components to U.S. and overseas manufacturers.clxxiv The AIA estimates that there 
are over 30,000 aerospace suppliers in the United States.clxxv  These include many 
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firms in the semiconductor and electronic products, printed circuit boards, machine 
tools, advanced materials, and bearings industries examined in this report. 
 
During the early 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, consolidation of the aerospace 
industry that had begun in the 1980s accelerated dramatically.  Over twenty-two 
years ago, the primary aerospace firms included 75 separate companies.  Today, 
only a handful of prime contractors remain—Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, 
Northrop Grumman, and General Dynamics—to serve the federal national security 
and space agencies.  Yet these firms also own holdings that lie outside of aerospace, 
including defense and commercial electronics and shipbuilding.  Several of these 
firms (Boeing, Northrop Grumman) and others (United Technologies, Gulfstream 
Aerospace, Textron, among others) are also major firms in the commercial 
aerospace sector.clxxvi  
 
Economic trends.  Aerospace is a major source of high-skilled, high-wage 
jobs in the U.S. economy.   It employs 500,000 workers, accounting for 4 percent of 
the nation’s manufacturing workforce.  About 61 percent of these jobs are 
concentrated in six states--Washington, California, Texas, Kansas, Connecticut, and 
Arizona.   Trends over the past decade, however, show substantial shrinkage of this 
workforce over the past two decades due to a variety of factors affecting both the 
commercial and defense business sides of the sector.clxxvii   
 
Business cycles.  By nature, the aerospace industry is cyclical, with industry-
specific cycles occurring approximately every 10 years, resulting from changing 
international conditions and market forces.  The commercial aircraft industry’s sales 
are tied to the health of the airline industry, which in turn depends on several 
factors that can influence demand for air travel, such as swings in economic activity, 
regional conflicts, terrorism, and disease outbreaks.   The defense segment is largely 
reliant on the U.S. government (DOD and NASA, in particular), and federal budget 
decisions for most of its sales.  Often a downward cycle in commercial aircraft sales 
is offset by large government contracts that sustain the defense aircraft side.  
 
The defense industry’s massive downsizing following the end of the Cold War drove 
a wave of aerospace and defense industry consolidation and restructuring.  The 
large “primes” emerged as full-fledged multinational corporations whose interests 
now transcended the domestic industrial base.  In order to grow and maintain 
healthy profit margins, these firms have become more and more reliant on foreign 
sales.  At the same time, as in most other major industrial sectors, the drive to lower 
costs in the face of increasingly fierce foreign competition, including offsets and 
other foreign trade practices, has led them to offshore large portions of their own 
production operations, and to rely on an increasingly global supplier base.  
 
After the drop off in aerospace business during the recession and defense cutbacks 
of the early 1990s, growth resumed in the mid-1990s, peaking in 1999 with 139 
     
 
60 
HRS/JSY—Manufacturing Insecurity 
 
billion USD worth of shipments.  From 1999 through 2003, the industry, like most 
other manufacturing sectors, fell into a pronounced slump—exacerbated by the 
9/11-induced troubles of the worldwide commercial airlines industry.  Total 
aerospace shipments plunged 11 percent below the 1999 peak, to 124.1 billion USD.  
Shipments by the aircraft and parts and the guided missile and space vehicle and 
parts subsectors each dropped by comparable amounts in these years.clxxviii 
 
The aerospace industry showed signs of recovery beginning in 2004.  Shipments, 
capacity growth and utilization, and employment all exhibited positive growth, as 
the industry experienced a lucrative period with a strong market upturn.  In 2008, 
aerospace manufacturing sales were 204.2 billion USD, up from 200.3 billion USD 
the year before (current US dollars), according to an AIA review, accounting for 1.4 
percent of U.S. GDP.   This was still down from 1.5 percent in 2000 and 1.7 percent in 
the late 1990s, however.clxxix   
 
 Employment and establishment trends.  These trends paralleled a much larger 
shift in both employment levels and the number of establishments, especially in the 
aircraft and parts subsectors.  Changes in the number of establishments and jobs by 
establishment sizes also displayed the same patterns. 
 Overall, between 1990 and 1995, aerospace employment fell nearly 40 percent, 
to 514,200, then bounced back over the next few years to a new peak of 578,600 
in 1999, before sharply declining again, with the greatest losses occurring in 
2002 and 2003.    
 In the aerospace products and parts sector (NAICS 3364), a net 47 plants of all 
sizes disappeared between 1999-2004—with mid-sized facilities suffering the 
greatest losses, though 83 percent of all job losses were recorded in the large 
plants that dominated employment in the industry.   
 Between 1999-2004, the aircraft, engines and parts industries (NAICS 336411-
13) were responsible for all the establishment losses and 90 percent of the job 
destruction in the aerospace sector.clxxx  
 The aerospace sector’s decline seemed to reverse itself in the 2000s decade, as 
the number of establishments increased by 6 percent between 1998-2008, 
though it lost two large establishments of over 1,000 employees, which in part 
accounted for the loss of 75,000 jobs, or a 13 percent drop, over this period.clxxxi 
 Employment in the aircraft manufacturing (336411) and aircraft engine and 
engine parts manufacturing (336412) industries fell by 15 percent each between 
1998-2008, mostly in large plants with 500 or more employees.clxxxii 
 The aircraft engines sector also saw a sizable loss in mid-sized establishments of 
100-499 employees (a 9 percent decline) and large facilities with 500-999 
employees (a 28 percent decline) between 1998-2008.clxxxiii  
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Import penetration.  Another sign of potential weakness in the American 
aerospace industry is the expanded penetration of imports into domestic aerospace 
markets.  Import penetration in the aircraft, aircraft engine and engine parts, and 
other aircraft part and auxiliary equipment manufacturing industries (NAICS codes 
336411, 336412, 336413) rose by 117 percent, 34 percent and 45 percent 
respectively, between 1997 and 2007.  In 2002, foreign manufacturers captured 15 
percent of the domestic aircraft manufacturing market, 40 percent of the aircraft 
and engine parts market, and 31 percent of the other aircraft part/auxiliary 
equipment market.  By 2007, these shares grew to 33 percent, 14 percent and 45 
percent respectively.clxxxiv  
 
In 2009, however, the worldwide recession greatly weakened all U.S. manufacturing, 
including aerospace. In 2008, commercial aircraft and parts shipments totaled 96.6 
billion USD, 63 percent of total aerospace shipments, but orders for new civil 
aircraft and parts fell for the first time since 2003.   
 
The loss on the commercial side was offset by strong military aircraft expenditures.  
Defense aircraft and parts equaled 56.4 billion USD in 2008, up 40 percent from 
2007.   Analysts predict, though, that there could be tough times ahead for military 
aircraft.clxxxv  For example, a New York Times article reported that problems in the 
building of Boeing’s new 787 Dreamliner aircraft were exacerbated by the 
recession, which curtailed orders for planes.  The company may not be able to 
depend on its large military business, which had buffered the company from a 
similar collapse of aviation after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, because of cuts 
in Pentagon spending on large weapons systems.clxxxvi      
 
International trade and offsets.  Aerospace products are one of the most 
important American exports, and they make up a major share of Advanced 
Technology Products trade (figure 16).  The industry has long enjoyed a positive 
trade balance, led by commercial aircraft and sales of military products to foreign 
governments (often subsidized by the U.S. government), and in recent years, has 
been one of the sole bright spots in the otherwise dismal U.S. trade picture.  After 
2000’s substantial drop to 26.5 billion USD, 35 percent below the peak of 1998, the 
aerospace trade surplus grew only sluggishly until 2004, when it rose to 30 billion 
USD, though in nominal terms, it was still only three-quarters its 1998 level.  
However, the aerospace trade surplus continued to grow through the remainder of 
the decade, rising to 54 billion USD in 2009.clxxxvii 
 
The large positive trade surpluses enjoyed by the aerospace sector reflect the heavy 
dependence of U.S. aerospace manufacturers on international markets for sales.  In 
2008, it sold more than 95 billion USD in aerospace vehicles and equipment 
(including defense and space products) to foreign customers in Japan, France, 
Germany, and United Kingdom, among others.  With imports of over 37 billion USD, 
its total trade balance grew to 57.8 billion USD in 2008.clxxxviii  
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The apparent strong performance of the aerospace industry in terms of sales and 
trade needs to be tempered by the understanding that some divisions within that 
sector, not to mention the large second- and third-tier supplier chain that provides 
subsystems, parts, components, and materials to the prime aerospace contractors 
(i.e., the systems integrators), have been weakening.  The profiles of the other 
industries examined here, and the evidence of Webber’s findings, strongly suggest 
that the erosion of the capacity of the industries that supply vital products and 
technologies for inclusion in defense systems—a trend substantially linked to 
offshoring trends in each industry—can ultimately weaken the competitiveness of 
the “primes” that build and assemble the large-scale end-product defense systems.  
As Webber concludes:  “The health of the big defense prime contractors depends on 
the innovation capability of the underlying manufacturing support base.  If the 
lowest tier of the manufacturing support base is healthy, then the innovators will be 
operating effectively, and consequently the top-tier integrators will also 
succeed.”clxxxix  
 
Offset agreements.  A key strategy of aerospace companies is to secure new 
foreign sales through offset agreements.  Offsets agreements and transactions 
require a domestic exporter of articles and services to foreign customers 
(government or commercial enterprises) to produce parts of the exported items in 
the foreign location or agree to the purchase of goods and services unrelated to the 
exported goods.  For example, the Indian government has made mandatory an offset 
clause for aerospace firms abroad that must be at least 30 percent of the total value 
of a deal.cxc   Most offsets have involved the export of defense items, though major 
commercial deals, such as Boeing’s foreign sales of its aircraft, also involve offset 
arrangements.  For example, transportation equipment, comprised mostly of 
aerospace products, accounted for nearly two-thirds of the total value of direct 
offsets, between 1993 and 2003.cxci  
 
American defense firms have entered into offset arrangements with foreign 
governments for decades (see Box E).  These arrangements, however, have grown 
increasingly prevalent, and recently, foreign governments have been requiring U.S. 
arms producers to provide offsets greater than the value of actual sales.  Indeed, 
foreign governments recently have been requiring U.S. arms producers selling their 
weapons overseas to provide offsets equal to a major share of the value of the actual 
sales (see figure 19).   According to the BIS, in 2003, the total value of offsets for the 
first time exceeded the value of the defense contracts to which they were linked—
offsets equaled 122 percent of sales—for the first time; a substantial increase over 
2002 levels.cxcii   Although the offsets/contract ratio fell in subsequent years, it was 
still well above 50 percent by 2008.  Offset arrangements totaled 68.93 billion USD 
and averaged 71.0 percent of the related defense contracts.cxciii    
 
Foreign beneficiaries.  European nations have been the largest beneficiaries, 
receiving offsets in 2003 equal to an average of 148.8 percent of the value of total 
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export agreements.cxciv  However, the data show—and Box E illustrates—that more 
countries outside of Europe also are demanding higher offset percentages, such as 
the Indian government requires that major foreign sales to India include offsets 
equal to 30 percent of the contract.  According to the BIS, as a result of a growing 
buyers’ market for defense goods, “almost all purchasers of U.S. defense systems 
require offset agreements as a condition of the sale.”cxcv  
 
 
Box E—AEROSPACE OFFSETS 
Offsets refer to agreements and transactions in which an exporter of articles and 
services to foreign customers (government or commercial enterprise) is required to 
produce parts of the exported items in the foreign location or agrees to the purchase of 
goods and services unrelated to the goods being exported.  Direct offsets are 
transactions directly related to the items or services exported by the domestic firm and 
usually take the form of co-production, subcontracting, technology transfer, training, 
production, licensed production, or financing activities.cxcvi  Indirect offsets involve 
transactions of goods and services not directly related to the items or services being 
exported.  They may include purchases, investment, training, financial activities, market 
and exporting assistance, and technology transfer.cxcvii  
 
Most offset arrangements are associated with the export of defense items, though 
major commercial deals, such as Boeing’s foreign sales of its aircraft, also involve offset 
arrangements.cxcviii A few examples: 
 In 2004, Lockheed Martin sold 48 F-16 fighters to the Polish Government, a contract 
worth 3.5 billion USD.  The estimated value of corresponding offsets was 9.7 billion 
USD, or 2.6 times the value of selling the F-16s themselves.  Direct offsets in the deal 
include Pratt & Whitney purchasing a Polish factory, modernizing it, and establishing 
a manufacturing line to produce lower complexity F-100 engine components for the 
Polish F-16s, which are shipped back to the United States for assembly into the 
engine.  Indirect offsets include the purchase of Roll-on Roll-off Ships from Polish 
shipyards; tooling for Cessna and Lycoming from Polish sources; components for 
land moving equipment, and other technologies.cxcix  
 
 In a 3.3 billion USD agreement for the sale of 40 F-15K Strike Eagle jets to South 
Korea, Boeing is required to give South Korea avionic, software and design 
technology valued at 1.5 billion USD.  Boeing will do the assembly of the completed 
jets in St. Louis, but the wings and front fuselages will be made in Korea.cc  
 In one of more than 300 offset agreements entered into over the last two decades, 
Lockheed was required to use Rolls-Royce engines, instead of ones made in the 
United States by General Electric, to power Apache attack aircraft sold in Europe.cci 
 Since the 1960s, foreign content from offset agreements in Boeing’s commercial 
aircraft has grown from only 2 percent to as high as 70 percent for its 787 
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Dreamliner. The offsets include the subcontracting of design and production of 
wings to Japanese firms—the first time Boeing has ever farmed out this vital, 
technologically sophisticated part of its aircraft manufacturing operations.ccii  
 In 2008, Boeing has sold 25 billion USD worth of civilian aircraft, ranging from Air 
America airliners to private business jets.  In return, Boeing has been investing in 
broadening India’s capability, including a 100 million USD maintenance center in 
Nagpur, the emerging intermodal transport hub for the country, and helping Air 
India set up a 75 million USD engineer and pilot training facility in Mumbai.  In high-
level manufacturing, meanwhile, Boeing has been encouraging Indian firms to 
become part of its supply chain.  For example, it has a 500 million USD deal with Tata 
Steel to provide titanium floor beams for the Dreamliner.cciii  
 Indian defense officials announced in January 2009 an agreement to purchase eight 
of Boeing’s P-8 Poseidon sub hunters, a militarized version of the 737 jetliner.  The 
2.1 billion USD contract is India’s largest military airplane deal with the United 
States.  Boeing agreed to offset commitments equal to 30 percent of the contract, as 
mandated by the Indian government.  In 2008, India agreed to buy six C-130J 
transports from Lockheed Martin for 1 billion USD, including the requisite offset 
agreement.cciv  
 
 
Figure 19 
Export Contracts and Offset Agreements, 1993-2008 
 
                   Source: BIS, Offsets in Defense Trade, Fourteenth Study, December 2009 
High Road Strategies 
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In addition, foreign governments’ growing desire to sustain or create new 
indigenous defense capabilities has boosted demands for offsets, which can mollify 
internal political objections to large public outlays for foreign-made weapon 
systems, and foster domestic economic development.  The BIS notes that developed 
countries with established defense industries use offsets to channel work or 
technology to their own defense companies.  Newly industrializing countries, such 
as China, employ offsets as a way of fostering the transfer of technology and know-
how to build up both their commercial and military capabilities. 
 
Most U.S. defense contractors have viewed these practices with mixed emotions. On 
the one hand, offsets deprive them of revenues and force them to make 
procurement decisions for political, rather than sound business reasons.  On the 
other hand, the priority that these contractors place on systems integration, as 
opposed to manufacturing, has reduced the perceived stakes in keeping components 
production in house, much less in country.  Moreover, these contractors believe that 
accepting offsets is usually the only way to keep expanding foreign sales and 
maintain production lines, increase the exports of both U.S. defense and commercial 
products, and improve interoperability.ccv  
 
On the other hand, offsets also open up more opportunities for contractors to 
expand their investment and presence in foreign markets, which may not 
necessarily be to the benefit of U.S. workers and communities.  The 2009 BIS report 
notes that offset agreements can negate some of the economic and industrial base 
benefits obtained through the sale of defense items to foreign entities.  The report 
observes, for example, that “offset transactions that require a high proportion of 
subcontracting, co-production, license production or purchases transactions can 
displace U.S. defense subcontractors and suppliers, and in some cases, portions of 
the prime contractor’s business.”ccvi 
 
Competitiveness and security concerns.   Despite the industry’s robust 
growth in exports and trade surpluses, industry experts have expressed concern 
that the growth of offsets as part of foreign sales transactions could adversely affect 
the health of the American aerospace industrial base.  The impacts of offsets 
arrangement on the aerospace industry are manifold: 
 Offsets have increased the pressure on U.S. firms to offshore more of their 
operations, leading to the loss of domestic manufacturing capacity and jobs, a 
trend that the USCC warned could “undermine U.S. global leadership in aircraft 
manufacturing.”ccvii  Offsets can directly cost jobs in some companies who, under 
these agreements, transfer to foreign producers work and manufacturing 
capacity that otherwise would remain in domestic facilities.  The increase in 
aerospace-related offsets could also lead to a rapid increase of imports of 
aerospace production, which would adversely affect U.S. jobs.ccviii  
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 Offsets have increased the pressure on U.S. firms to offshore more of their 
operations, leading to the loss of domestic manufacturing capacity and jobs, a 
trend that the USCC warned could “undermine U.S. global leadership in aircraft 
manufacturing.”ccix  Offsets can directly cost jobs in some companies who, under 
these agreements, transfer to foreign producers work and manufacturing 
capacity that otherwise would remain in domestic facilities.  The increase in 
aerospace-related offsets could also lead to a rapid increase of imports of 
aerospace production, which would adversely affect U.S. jobs.ccx  
 The growth of offsets and outsourcing by large U.S. contractors could hurt small 
and medium-sized defense contractors.  Offset agreements that include 
subcontract or licensed production offsets could displace U.S. subcontractors 
and suppliers.ccxi  Previous experience has shown, the BIS notes, that U.S. 
contractors “sometimes develop long-term supplier relationships with overseas 
subcontractors based on short-term requirements,” which can reduce future 
business opportunities for U.S. subcontractors.ccxii  Not only are suppliers 
squeezed by their customers’ requirements to be leaner, their foreign 
competitors can benefit from offset agreements made with their customers.  This 
creates greater demand on U.S. suppliers, and possibly hurts industries that 
supply critical components to the U.S. aerospace industry.ccxiii  
 The growing demand for offset agreements by foreign countries is making U.S. 
aerospace firms more reliant on foreign firms.  As the U.S. supplier base erodes, 
especially in the second and third-tiers, defense contractors become increasingly 
dependent on foreign suppliers for critical products.ccxiv  University of Buffalo 
geographers David Pritchard and Alan MacPherson note, “Boeing has become 
increasingly dependent upon outside suppliers for technologically complex 
and/or critical airframe components such as wings, fuselage assemblies, center 
wing boxes, and tail sections.”ccxv  The outsourcing of the design and 
construction of wing and fuselage sections are at the root of Boeing’s recent 
production and delivery problems with its 787 Dreamliner.ccxvi  Offsets also add 
to the financial pressures on U.S. firms who are increasingly reliant on foreign 
partners for financial support. ccxvii 
 Offsets transfer technological and production capabilities to foreign governments 
and companies, helping to enhance or create current and future foreign 
competitors.ccxviii  Not only do direct offsets send aerospace work overseas, they 
are helping other nations move up the value chain in aerospace production.  This 
represents the conscious efforts of other nations to build up the capabilities of 
their own industries, which then compete directly with U.S. companies, including 
hard hit suppliers.ccxix  Offsets also can lead to the transfer of sensitive 
technology and production to foreign defense industries, raising national 
security issues.ccxx 
 
As Charles Wessner of the NRC’s Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy 
has noted, “Offsets are a symptom of a broader challenge mounted by foreign 
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governments determined to support their aerospace industries—both their 
commercial and defense components—by whatever means possible in a strategic 
sense, they are one tool from a tool kit of foreign industrial policies focused on the 
aerospace industry and its high-tech manufacturing.”ccxxi  Boeing’s expansive offset 
agreements exemplify this situation.  They include technology transfer 
arrangements that jeopardize Boeing’s competitiveness in global aircraft markets by 
helping Japan, China and others build planes on their own. 
 
China’s Commercial Aircraft Company and Japan’s Kasaki Heavy Industries, along 
with Russian and Canadian regional jet manufacturers, have plans to make planes 
large enough to compete with Boeing and Airbus.ccxxii  Pritchard and MacPherson 
noted that as Japan “incrementally acquired production for a wide range of airframe 
components via years of industrial offsets from Boeing, the transfer of wing 
manufacturing and assembly expertise to Japanese companies” will now effectively 
give Japan “‘total production competence’ with regard to commercial 
airframes.”ccxxiii   
 
Similarly, as the USCC observed, “China nurtures its domestic aviation and 
aerospace industry by exploiting the international competition already present in 
the industry.”ccxxiv  Other nations are also utilizing U.S. offsets and outsourcing 
arrangements to build up their aerospace capacity.  For example Boeing’s F-15 K 
Strike Eagle deal with South Korea is expected to result in the transfer of jobs and 
skills that will enable South Korea to produce its own fighter jet by 2015.ccxxv 
 
vi. Other Sectors 
A number of other representative sectors that provide critical materials, 
technologies, products and systems to the defense industrial base could also be 
examined.  These range from the relatively “low-tech” ball and roller bearings 
industry to cutting edge technology products such as optoelectronics, both with 
applications important to defense applications as well as commercially.  The erosion 
of U.S. capabilities in these industries at opposite ends of the technological spectrum 
follows similar patterns as the other industries profiled in the report, illustrating 
again how the endemic erosion of the U.S. manufacturing base contributes to a 
corresponding weakening of U.S. defense industrial capability.  
 
Bearings manufacturing.  Ball and roller bearings (NAICS 332991) 
represent critical components used ubiquitously in defense products (as well as in 
numerous civilian products). Bearings are carefully engineered, precision-made 
components that enable machinery to move at extremely high speeds and carry 
great loads with ease and efficiency.  Bearings are found in a very wide range of 
applications from automobiles, airplanes, computers, construction equipment, 
machine tools, DVD players, refrigerators and ceiling fans. The Pentagon considers 
them to be “critical components to weapon systems.”ccxxvi 
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While bearings do not meet Webber’s criteria of directly contributing to the 
innovation capabilities of the defense industrial base, they nevertheless require 
advanced production processes to achieve the very high levels of precision needed 
to serve their function in defense systems.  In order to do their primary job—reduce 
friction—manufacturers are constantly in search of new materials, lubrications, and 
coatings to improve bearing life and their ability to hold up in harsh 
environments.ccxxvii  
 
The bearings industry has suffered significant losses in employment and 
establishment numbers over the 2000s decade.  It also has been suffering from 
growing trade deficits and import penetration.  For example: 
 Employment fell by 31 percent, from 39,500 to around 27,250, between 2001 
and June 2009;   
 The industry lost a total of 13 percent of its establishments of all sizes, from 251 
to 219, over the same period;ccxxviii  
 The import penetration rate for ball and roller bearing manufacturing grew by 
nearly one-fifth over the 1997-2007 decade, from 22.6 percent to 27.1 
percent;ccxxix BIS data suggest that the ball bearing segment in the industry might 
be suffering from even worse IPRs.ccxxx   
 
As early as 2000, an Army-sponsored study warned of the continued attempt by 
foreign concerns to dominate the U.S. industrial base for ball bearings, noting that 
only two out of the world’s top ten ball bearing manufacturers were U.S. companies 
at that time.  Although the Army expected the domestic super precision bearing 
market to remain vibrant due to the industry’s high labor costs, the U.S. bearings 
industry was described as a prime candidate for offshoring production.  Meanwhile, 
foreign firms were willing to subsidize production to gain U.S. market share while 
trade barriers limited U.S. exports.ccxxxi 
 
In 2002 the Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission 
slapped a dumping duty on Chinese bearings imports, in response to a petition by 
the American Bearings Manufacturing Association (ABMA) (but rescinded it 6 
months later).  The ABMA claimed that the 2 billion USD U.S. market was being 
overrun with unfairly-priced ball bearings from China, which threatens the survival 
of the domestic industry, and complained that Chinese ball bearings and parts 
imports into the United States had reached record levels each of the four previous 
years.ccxxxii 
 
The pressure on U.S. bearings manufacturers to offshore their production has 
continued throughout the decade.  The market for bearings is still very strong in the 
United States, Europe and Japan, because of the advanced industrial and 
technological nature of their economies as well as the large number of bearing-
containing equipment.ccxxxiii  Sales for bearings in the developing economies, 
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however, are expected to outpace sales in the advanced developed regions through 
2013.ccxxxiv  Most bearing manufacturing is now being done in low-cost 
countries,ccxxxv and as foreign suppliers improve the quality of their goods, U.S.-
based bearing companies are being forced to invest increasingly in overseas 
manufacturing plants, limiting advances in domestic industrial production.ccxxxvi   
  
Optoelectronics.  As the 2010 USCC report notes, optoelectronics is another 
“advanced technology industry that might have stayed in the United States but is 
now almost completely relocated overseas.”ccxxxvii  Optoelectronics is used in 
emitting diodes, and solar technology, among other advanced technologies.  This 
includes photovoltaic panels, solid-state lighting systems that reduce electricity 
consumption by a factor of five in new generation televisions and 
telecommunications, and sensors that will be deployed in numerous mechanical and 
industrial systems, roadways, electrical grids and manufacturing production.ccxxxviii 
 
Optoelectronics was considered a strategic critical technology for national defense 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  According to Michael Lebby, president and CEO 
of the Optoelectronics Industry Development Association (OIDA) in Washington, DC, 
other than for parts built to military spec, “most manufacturing and assembly has 
moved outside the United States or is in the process of doing so.”ccxxxix  The Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency was concerned enough about maintaining the 
U.S. capability in optoelectronics that it helped to create OIDA in order to champion 
domestic efforts to preserve this capacity.  
  
The U.S. loss of optoelectronics manufacturing is reflected in the rapid growth in the 
U.S. trade deficit, which rose from only 3 billion USD in 2002 to 21 billion USD in 
2008 in the Advanced Technology Products account.ccxl  Most of the manufacturing 
capacity being installed offshore, and the infrastructure for all of the 
subcomponents is now in Asia.  As a result, Lebby contended, even if labor costs 
were equalized, “you would still have to be there. . . You can’t just bring back the 
assembly and manufacturing of components. You have to get the subcomponents 
back as well.”  A major additional worry is that R&D and technical know-how will 
follow the shift in optoelectronics manufacturing capacity.  Although innovation 
hasn’t shifted away from the United States yet, Lebby said that we “are beginning to 
see China, Taiwan, and Korea come up with really creative solutions,” and over the 
next decade “they will be climbing the design and innovation ladder.”ccxli  
 
The Chinese government, for example, which supported the shift of some 
manufacturing of optoelectronics to China, is now trying to attract research and 
design work, the highest value-added portion of the industry.  It has created five 
national laboratories and is sponsoring academic-industry collaborations around 
the country with the hope of leapfrogging the United States and Europe.  The focus 
of these efforts includes liquid crystal displays, plasma screens, light-emitting 
diodes and solar technology, among others.”ccxlii 
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IV.   Eroding Technology Leadership 
The industries profiled above encompass widely varied products and processes.  
They operate in different markets and maintain different relationships with the 
Pentagon and the military industrial base, though each provides products and 
technologies critical to national security.  Nevertheless, they have important 
characteristics in common.  They all show signs of erosion in their physical, human, 
and technological capabilities over the past decade, and some for considerably 
longer periods of time.  At the same time, all have been greatly affected by the 
intense competitive pressures of global markets, and, to varying degrees, each 
sector has experienced migration of production and jobs overseas. 
 
These trends parallel the aggregate statistical patterns for the entire industrial base, 
described in section II, that, taken together, demonstrate a broad-based, cross-
cutting weakening and erosion of the nation’s manufacturing base that could 
worsen over time if corrective actions are not taken.  There are a range of other 
industry sectors and their subdivisions—shipbuilding, fabricated metals 
manufacturing, primary metals, nonmetallic mineral products, apparel and textile 
products—which, while they still may be economically important and are not 
necessarily “critical” to the defense base, supply specific products and technologies 
critical to national security.  Most of these industries exhibit similar patterns of 
domestic erosion and global dispersion, which could undermine their long-term 
ability to produce these defense critical products domestically.   
 
A key premise of this report is that if the underlying civilian manufacturing base 
continues to unravel, even with direct interventions by the Pentagon to preserve 
specific defense-unique technological and production capabilities (e.g., the DOD’s 
“trusted” production strategy), defense agencies and contractors would become 
increasingly forced to rely on foreign sources for vital goods.  As has been noted, this 
is a controversial point, and not all Pentagon planners or industry officials (i.e., from 
the large systems integrator companies) believe that this is a problem.  On the other 
hand, other experts from government, industry, labor and academia, argue that 
ultimately this trend is damaging to national security readiness.   
 
Support for the latter view, in particular, comes from evidence that the erosion in 
the U.S. manufacturing base is directly contributing to an apparent erosion of the 
nation’s innovation capabilities and undermining America’s global technological 
leadership.   As Webber warned:  
If the overlooked manufacturing support base that props up the entire national 
innovation system continues to deteriorate in the United States, but grows and 
thrives overseas, then large numbers of America’s most innovative companies might 
be inclined to move overseas to be closer to production and the necessary support 
base. . . . Significant deterioration of companies that design and make discrete 
components is triggering a fundamental hollowing out of the national innovation 
system.ccxliii   
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Of special concern is the tight, overlapping relationship between the design, 
development and production of both commercial and defense-specific technologies 
and products.  Two key aspects of this relationship are examined below: 
 The linkage between R&D and innovation with manufacturing activity, and 
how erosion in the latter is undermining the nation’s innovation capacity;  
 The related link between manufacturing and maintaining a base of scientific, 
technological and industrial know-how embodied in a highly educated and 
trained, skilled workforce.  
 
a.  Offshoring innovation.   
The impacts of an eroding domestic manufacturing base on national security largely 
stem from the military’s growing reliance on commercial cutting-edge technology 
since the 1980s.  There are reasonable doubts that military technology still lags 
commercial technologies in all areas, as it generally did during the 1980s and 1990s.  
Starting in those years, and continuing into the present, defense procurement policy 
has put an emphasis on promoting greater civilian-military integration, and 
encouraging agencies and their contractors to purchase commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) and “dual-use” technology products.  The rationale is that drawing on the 
often more innovative civilian sector not only would yield more up-to-date products 
but also big cost savings. 
 
Many, if not most, “dual-use” contractors and suppliers try to separate their defense 
and commercial businesses, in large part to avoid the bureaucratic drag of defense 
procurement requirements on their commercial work.  Nevertheless, the ability of a 
firm to design, innovate, and improve on defense-critical technologies or devices 
that it produces for defense markets, increasingly depends on its ability to preserve 
and draw upon the technological edge it has obtained in its commercial business.   
 
As military products become more reliant on commercial advanced technologies, 
technology transfer from commercial technologies into defense-critical products 
requires a close relationship between the Pentagon or defense contractor customer 
and the suppliers of these technologies.  However, as the commercial base upon 
which the defense sector relies for most of its components and subsystems 
globalizes, integrating commercial technology into defense systems becomes more 
difficult to achieve.  That is, the loss of production facilities can lead to the loss of 
innovation capabilities, which would dangerously undermine the nation’s ability to 
maintain a strong defense base.   
 
Specifically, the migration of manufacturing offshore is associated with the following 
trends:  
 Weakening innovation capabilities of domestic industrial sectors; 
 The transfer—deliberate and unwitting—of cutting-edge technologies and 
know-how to economic rivals and potential military adversaries; and 
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 A decline in the United States’ overall technological leadership in the world.   
 
Laboratories of production.  The close link between manufacturing and 
technology development and innovation is apparent in each of the industries 
profiled above.  Jack Schilling’s observation that “technology development travels 
with the manufacturing process,” and that  “[o]ur plants in the specialty metal 
industry are our laboratories,”ccxliv holds as much for traditional manufacturing 
industries such as machine tools and ball bearings as it does for advanced high-tech 
sectors such as microelectronics, printed circuit boards, or systems integrator-
dominated industries such as aerospace.  Many experts agree not only that 
manufacturing and technology development are intimately linked, but also that 
manufacturing’s migration is contributing to the erosion of U.S. innovation and R&D 
capacity itself. 
 
For example, a 2002 report of the Defense Advisory Group on Electronic Devices 
(AGED) warned of “global economic, political and technological trends that threaten 
the ability of the U.S. to be a world leader in technology.”  It was especially 
concerned that the “off-shore movement of intellectual capital and industrial 
capability, particularly in microelectronics, has impacted the ability of the U.S. to 
research and produce the best technologies and products for the nation and the 
warfighter.”  The report concludes that over the previous decade, these “profound 
changes in the R&D base are adversely affecting cutting edge electronics for 
warfighter superiority and may potentially slow the engine for economic 
growth.”ccxlv   
 
As AGED’s chairman, Thomas Hartwick explained in testimony before Congress, 
without actual production remaining onshore, even America’s most knowledge-
intensive sectors could become hollowed out.  He expressed worry that the 
“structure of the U.S. high-tech industry is coming unglued with innovation and 
design losing their tie to prototype fabrication and manufacturing.”  Inventions, he 
claimed, would be left “on the cutting room floor because they cannot be 
manufactured.”  As a result, there may not be a U.S. manufacturing base capable of 
creating “mega-billion industries like micro-electromechanical systems or 
nanotechnologies.”ccxlvi  This danger is apparent in the industries examined in this 
report.  
 
 Semiconductor R&D.   Over the last decade, industry leaders have warned that 
as semiconductor production moves offshore to places such as Taiwan and China, 
more and more research activities will be drawn along with it.  Some experts have 
noted that as the manufacturing process become more complex, developing close 
relationships among design and manufacturing becomes increasingly important to 
enable feedback discussions between the two types of activities.ccxlvii  This concern 
was raised, for example, with respect to the design and production of photomasks, a 
crucial component in semiconductor manufacturing.  As integrated circuits increase 
their densities, masks become more and more complex, forcing the costs of mask 
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sets to soar, prompting some government officials to worry about a growing 
disconnect between the conceptual design of new chips and the ability to 
manufacturer them.ccxlviii 
 
In its 2005 report, the Defense Science Board (DSB) asserted that “[s]emiconductor 
technology and manufacturing leadership is a national priority that must be 
maintained if the U.S. military is to continue to lead in applying electronics to 
support the warfighter.”  Key to maintaining this leadership, moreover, is preserving 
the “close coupling of manufacturing with the development of advanced technology 
and the design of leading-edge integrated circuits.”  This is best achieved, the report 
contends, “if development and manufacturing are co-located.”ccxlix  The report 
further observes that leading-edge R&D has historically tended to migrate along 
with production leaders, consequently attracting the most talented process 
scientists and engineers toward advanced production.  But, if this production has 
gone offshore,   “[t]he close collaboration between process engineers and designers 
required for lead-edge chip development could be rendered ineffective for the U.S. 
defense industry.ccl 
 
According to industry leader William J. Spencer, “semiconductor manufacturing is a 
learning-by-doing industry.”  U.S. chip fabrication plants historically have anchored 
the specialized industrial clusters including R&D labs and the facilities of 
semiconductor equipment and materials makers, which in turn work closely with 
device manufacturers on technology development.  The close proximity of 
fabrication facilities to R&D facilities therefore “is important for researchers and 
manufacturers alike.”ccli  But if U.S. chip manufacturing moves offshore, the link with 
chip design and innovation is weakened, and these clusters begin to unravel.  
Spencer predicted that “although U.S. clients of Asian foundries believe they can 
retain in-house chip design expertise in the absence of manufacturing, their 
negotiating position may shift as capacity tightens,” a problem that could be 
exacerbated with the need to maintain effective intellectual property protections, 
which is difficult at best in China.cclii  
 
 Printed circuit board R&D.  Industry leaders have also warned of the 
obstacles to reestablishing a printed circuit board industry if production capacity 
leaves the United States, because R&D and critical design know-how would leave 
with it.ccliii  This concern was raised by the National Research Council’s report on 
manufacturing trends in the PCB industry, which traced the loss of R&D in that 
industry to the loss and migration of manufacturing.  In 1980, the report notes, 
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and their captive factories manufactured 
52 percent of the PCBs made in the United States.  These OEMs traditionally spent 
about 10 percent of the sales values of these in-house-produced products on R&D 
efforts aimed at improving manufacturing, quality, and yields.  By 2001, however, 
the estimated percentage of PCB production by domestic OEMs had dropped to 1 
percent, and by 2004, only a few OEM facilities remained.  Their capacity (primarily 
for dedicated military products) was less than 0.1 percent of the total U.S. output.  
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As a result of this shift, the NRC states, “the traditional sources of R&D funding 
dropped by two orders of magnitude.  In reality, the critical mass of R&D in this 
industry disappeared, reducing the investment in new technology to near zero.”ccliv  
 
A similar trend was evident in the PCB supply base, which was another big source of 
R&D resources.  Funding for technical activities from these manufacturers was once 
estimated at 10 percent of all U.S.-generated supplier sales dollars in the 1990s.  By 
2001, both the levels of sales and the share spent on R&D were declining.  In 2003, it 
was estimated that less than 3 percent of sales income was spent on technical 
activities to support PCB manufacturing.  “The effect of this loss of R&D spending” 
the NRC predicted, “is expected to have long-term effects.  In 1999, U.S.-based PCB 
suppliers spent an estimated 50 million USD on technical activities and new-process 
and -product R&D.  In 2005, this sector will spend less than 10 million USD for such 
R&D.”cclv  
 
 Advanced materials R&D.  Comparable findings have been presented for the 
advanced materials sector.  The NRC’s report on the globalization of materials R&D 
concluded that as U.S. materials manufacturing disappears and moves offshore, 
domestic materials R&D capacity has diminished.  Meanwhile, many U.S. companies, 
attracted to the growing availability of often lower cost foreign intellectual 
resources, have shifted their materials science and engineering R&D activities to 
follow their manufacturing operations overseas.cclvi  The net result has been an 
erosion of U.S. leadership in advanced materials R&D.  The NRC reported several 
instances that illustrate this trend:   
 Research into the production, processing, and development of metallic materials 
in the United States has been declining since 1998.  Metal producers do very 
little alloy development anymore, and companies in metal consuming industries 
have also decreased their efforts.  Evidence suggests that the United States is 
losing its leadership role in metals R&D.  There are no signs that this trend will 
be reversed any time soon.cclvii 
 Superalloy R&D has declined significantly for over a decade, as U.S. firms 
confront slower demand and higher costs, and many face financial difficulty.  
Attracted by lower costs, superalloy manufacturers are increasingly locating 
their production offshore.  The NRC predicted that U.S. companies that move 
overseas will remain competitive and survive “only to the extent that they are 
privy to future developments at non-U.S. laboratories and plants.”cclviii  
 Composites are a critical technology used in major defense systems such as the 
F-22 fighter jet, ballistic missiles and orbital satellites.  Once unchallenged, U.S. 
leadership in composites has been supplanted by other countries.  Europe now 
leads in composites manufacturing and modeling, and there are fewer U.S. 
commercial carbon-carbon composite manufacturers and far fewer companies 
providing oxidation coatings than 10 years ago.  U.S. defense and commercial 
programs—the Joint Strike Fighter and Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner—have 
outsourced production and supporting R&D in composites overseas.  The NRC 
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concluded that without long-term investments in composite research, the United 
States risks losing the ability “to exploit the promise of composites because of 
the significant and continuing decline of its leadership in the subfield.”  
Moreover, U.S. industry could “stagnate and eventually become uncompetitive 
with foreign companies that have maintained active research programs.”cclix 
 Electronic and opto-photonic materials are critical technologies for maintaining 
leadership in semiconductors, and as noted above, this industry and its material 
supply chain are moving toward a global processing and manufacturing 
infrastructure that is taking some of its R&D capacity with it.  Many large 
electronic materials suppliers have globalized their manufacturing base and 
support laboratories.cclx 
 The ceramicscclxi and catalysiscclxii industries have been following similar 
trajectories.  As manufacturing in these sectors confronts growing foreign 
competition—especially from China and other Asian nations—and globalizes 
their production, their R&D activities are also globalizing, and U.S. leadership in 
these critical technologies has declined.   
 
 Aerospace R&D.  Aerospace is another critical industry witnessing a 
migration in manufacturing accompanied by diminished R&D capacity at home.  For 
example, Boeing has transferred a wide-range of critical technologies to foreign 
partners in offset arrangements for its new 787 line.  Industry specialists Pritchard 
and MacPherson reported on Boeing’s lack of R&D investment for its commercial 
product lines, noting that Boeing trailed Airbus with regard to R&D and capital 
spending for many years.  For example, in 2003 Airbus allocated 9.5 percent of its 
total revenues towards R&D, while Boeing spent only 3.5 percent.cclxiii  In testimony 
to the USCC, Heidi Wood of Morgan Stanley stated that “Boeing has been . . . possibly 
insufficiently innovative,” as its commercial R&D-to-sales ratio was projected to be 
4.8 percent in 2005, compared to Airbus projected at 8.5-9 percent.  Overall, the 
USCC warns that “[t]he ability of the U.S. aerospace industry to attract investment 
and sustain a base for high-technology development is . . . reportedly at risk and may 
deteriorate further as more aerospace technologies migrate offshore.”cclxiv 
         
Measuring the extent to which U.S industrial R&D—especially that performed by 
industries that constitute the defense industrial base—has eroded over the decade 
or more warrants additional research.  National Science Foundation statistics on 
total U.S. industrial R&D funding and performance indicate that both declined over 
the first half of the 2000s decade,cclxv though this trend then reversed itself, rising 
steadily from 2003 to 2007.   U.S. industry continues to be a major supporter of R&D 
domestically and internationally.   
 
For purposes of the current analysis, however, the most important trends are at the 
disaggregated industrial sector level (i.e., at the NAICS 6-digit level).  As the 
examples above suggest, at this level, considerable evidence shows that U.S. 
innovation capacity in critical industrial sectors has been eroding—and may 
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continue to deteriorate as production in these sectors continues to move away.   
This finding is consistent with the findings of authoritative investigations of U.S. 
industrial and technological competitiveness.  For example, the 2005 report of the 
National Academy of Sciences Committee on Prospering in the Global Economy of 
the 21st Century, Rising Above the Gathering Storm, states that: “Having reviewed the 
trends in the United States and abroad, the committee is deeply concerned that the 
scientific and technical building blocks of our economic leadership are eroding at a 
time when many other nations are gathering strength.”cclxvi 
 
Similarly, the USCC’s 2005 report to Congress recognized that this trend presented 
potential problems for U.S. defense capabilities.  It observes that as the DOD 
becomes more reliant on private sector technology developments, “the private 
sector is moving offshore much of its industrial and technology production and 
some of its technology design and research and development.”cclxvii  Noting that 
maintaining leadership in technological innovation is critical for national security, 
and that commercial technologies increasingly set the direction for military 
technologies, the report warns that “a lack of innovation in the private sector could 
have serious detrimental effects on the capability to produce innovative military 
technology.”cclxviii  
 
Migrating R&D.  The offshore migration of U.S. innovation capabilities has 
also been a contributing factor in the buildup of other countries’ R&D capacities.  
Moreover, the more factories that are built overseas, the more powerful the 
attraction of offshoring R&D becomes, as multinational companies want their 
facilities to be located in the closest proximity possible.  As noted above, for 
example, aerospace offset arrangements are an important means of technology 
transfer between U.S. commercial and defense aerospace firms and foreign 
companies, which is leading to a build up of aerospace manufacturing and R&D 
capacity in countries such as Japan, China and South Korea.   
 
Similarly, the NRC study of advanced materials R&D globalization identified several 
subfields—composites, ceramics, electronics and opto-photonic materials, catalysis, 
and magnetic materials, among others—where large commercial and defense firms 
are moving R&D and customer support functions overseas to be close to new 
manufacturing bases they have created. cclxix  
 
A BusinessWeek article, “Outsourcing Innovation,” identified two types of design and 
R&D offshoring, both of which have increased in recent years.  One refers to 
corporate outsourcing of R&D or product design to other, foreign firms, as in the 
practice of companies such as Dell, Motorola, and Philips buying complete designs of 
digital devices from Asian developers, modifying them to their own specifications, 
and selling them under their own brand names. cclxx  Although the electronics sector 
has the greatest experience in this area, “the search for offshore help with 
innovation is spreading to nearly every corner of the economy.”  Other examples 
include Boeing working with India’s HCL Technologies to co-develop software for 
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navigation systems, landing gear, cockpit controls and other systems for the its 787 
Dreamliner aircraft, pharmaceutical giant Eli Lilly teaming with Asian biotech 
research firms to develop new drugs, and Proctor & Gamble seeking to generate half 
of its new product ideas offshore by 2010, compared to 20 percent now. cclxxi  
 
Although Taiwan may be one of the principal locations for contract design outfits, 
China and India have become leading sites for foreign direct investment (FDI) by 
large multinational corporations (MNCs) for establishing R&D centers, either their 
own or, frequently, with local partners.  As Box F illustrates, the numbers and 
quality of U.S. MNC investments in R&D centers in China and India in particular have 
accelerated over the past decade.   MNC’s are especially attracted to these nation’s 
abundant pools of highly-educated engineers and high-tech workers capable of 
taking on increasingly sophisticated high-tech work, while being willing to work for 
wages far below U.S. and European levels.  
 
Some U.S. firms prefer to hold onto their critical design and development work 
rather than farm it out to foreign contract design and manufacturing firms.  Others 
have increased their R&D and design capacity and employment at their labs in India, 
China, and Eastern Europe, while downsizing their U.S. labs.  For example, Lucent 
Bell Labs in Murray Hill, NJ, which once employed well over 6,000 workers, is now a 
shadow of its former self following Lucent’s merger with French telecom equipment 
and services giant Alcatel (forming Alcatel-Lucent) in December 2006.  Meanwhile 
employment at its Chinese and India R&D centers has expanded.cclxxii    
 
 
Box F 
U.S. Corporate R&D Investments and Technology Transfer in China and India 
 
Rochester Institute of Technology public policy professor Ron Hira noted in his study of 
R&D globalization that there is no comprehensive list of R&D investments in China by 
U.S. MNCs.cclxxiii  However, an ongoing Cambridge University study shows that emerging 
economies like India and China are fast becoming favored destinations for global R&D 
with top MNCs, such as GM, IBM, Cisco, Motorola and GE.  According to this 2009 
survey—covering 500 of the largest MNCs operating in 21 major world economies—
China ranked fifth and India seventh in housing R&D activities; the United States, 
Germany, Japan, and the UK ranked first through fourth and France ranked sixth.  India 
has 63 such centers while China has 98.  Among countries attracting more R&D centers, 
China and India ranked fourth and fifth, respectively.cclxxiv 
R&D INVESTMENTS IN CHINA 
China has been attracting the largest number of foreign MNC’s to set up R&D centers 
and form joint ventures.  Yale School of Management dean Jeffrey E. Garten recounts in 
BusinessWeek that in 2005 General Electric had 27 laboratories in China working on 
projects ranging from composite-materials design to molecular molding, and Microsoft 
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had nearly 200 researchers in China, with “Cisco, DaimlerChrysler, IBM, Intel and many 
others” following suit.cclxxv  According to MBG Information Services’ Charles McMillion, 
over 400 of the largest companies in the world had invested in China by June 2002, 
including Microsoft, General Electric, Sony, Exxon-Mobile, Royal Dutch Shell, General 
Motors, Toyota, Volkswagen, Boeing, Matsushita, Siemens, Toshiba, Intel, Kodak, 
Hewlett-Packard and IBM.cclxxvi  According to an estimate by China’s Ministry of 
Commerce, by 2008, foreign MNCs had established 1,160 research institutions in China.  
This compares to only 30 such institutions in 1999, about 200 in 2001 and 700 by 
2005.cclxxvii   
 General Motors’ technology transfers to China in the 1990s took the form of joint 
research and development projects, and training of Chinese workers and 
managers.cclxxviii  In 1997, it entered into a 50-50 joint venture with Shanghai 
Automotive Industry for establishing a research center, which now employs 1,300 
workers.cclxxix  By 1999, both GM and Ford had established several research institutes 
in China devoted to developing technology.cclxxx  In 2008, GM started construction of 
a new wholly-owned advanced R&D center in Shanghai to develop hybrid 
technology and other advanced designs, resulting in a total investment of 250 
million USD.  The center is expected to house 2,500 employees, of which 300 would 
be engaged in R&D.  This was the first stage in GM’s planned move of its Asia-Pacific 
headquarters along with other operations in China to the new center.cclxxxi   
 Lucent Technologies entered China in 1985.  By 2005 its investment in China totaled 
2.9 billion USD, with 8 regional offices, two Bell Labs branches, five R&D facilities 
and several joint ventures and wholly owned enterprises. Lucent China produces an 
array of telecom network equipment and solutions shipped and installed worldwide.  
In 2005, it employed 4,000 employees.cclxxxii  Bell Labs, which had been in China since 
1997, with development labs in Beijing and Shanghai, has since built a basic research 
center in China, its first such facility outside the United States, to broaden and 
deepen its research in China, and integrate research done in the United States.cclxxxiii  
In 2010, Alcaltel-Lucent was chosen by China Telecom to deploy advanced network 
technologies in Shanghai and Shangdong province, to leverage its strong and 
localized R&D capacity to build a next-generation telecom infrastructure.cclxxxiv 
 Most of Motorola’s hardware is assembled and partly designed in China.cclxxxv  The 
company established its first R&D lab in China in 1993. By 2006 it had 17 R&D 
centers and labs in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Nanjing, Chengdu and Hangzhou 
provinces, employing 3,000 workers,cclxxxvi with investments of over 100 million USD 
annually,cclxxxvii and totaling US 1 billion USD by 2008, with plans to increase spending 
in product innovation and technology upgrades.cclxxxviii  The centers provide Chinese 
operators with local access to Motorola’s network technologies, including extensive 
R&D services for next-generation technologies and developing local talent.cclxxxix  In 
2006, Motorola estimated that 10 percent of its 3,000 patents in China were 
obtained by local R&D center.ccxc In 2007, Motorola announced the inauguration of a 
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new R&D complex in Wangling, Beijing, which is expected to employ 3,000, including 
2,000 engineers.ccxci  
 Intel is building a 2.5 billion USD 300mm semiconductor facility in Dalian, China, its 
first fab in Asia.  In April 2008, the company announced a 500 million USD Intel 
Capital China Technology Fund for investments in wireless broadband, technology, 
media, telecommunications and “clean” technology.ccxcii   
 Cummins, which in 1995 opened a diesel-engine plant in China, celebrated in 2005 
its 20-year strategic partnership with China’s Dongfeng Group by opening the East 
Asia R&D center in Wuhan Economic and Technological Development Zone.  This is 
China’s first joint-equity R&D center specializing in engine study, and represents a 
move from a collaboration in product development and manufacturing to joint 
R&D.ccxciii 
R&D INVESTMENTS IN INDIA 
In 2006, India was reportedly drawing 25 percent of new global investments in R&D 
centers set up by MNCs, and these centers are currently among the MNCs’ largest 
outside the U.S. or Europe.  Over 200 global companies across information technology, 
biotechnology, chemicals, automobiles, consumer goods and pharmaceuticals have set 
up their R&D hubs in India. These include Oracle, Intel, Adobe, STMicroelectronics, IBM, 
Texas Instruments, Delphi, HP, Microsoft, GE, Philips, Motorola, Google, Cisco, Eli Lily, 
Bayer, Siemens and LG Electronics have all been tapping Indian talent for conducting 
cutting-edge research.ccxciv  
 GM has eight research labs in India, including the India Science Lab established in 
Bangalore in 2003, with more than 70 percent of its researchers holding Ph.Ds.  GM 
has also established collaborative research laboratories with Indian universities.  
India hosts two out of three such labs that GM has outside of the United States—out 
of a total of nine such labs.ccxcv   
 Intel began its presence in India with a sales office in 1988 and established an R&D 
center in 1998.  By 2007, it was employing 2,500 R&D workers in India and had 
invested 1.7 billion USD in its Indian operations.  Notably, Intel’s Bangalore 
Development center contributed to about half the work towards its “teraflop 
research chip,” and in 2008, Intel unveiled its first microprocessor designed entirely 
in India—the first 45-nanometer technology designed outside of the United 
States.ccxcvi 
 Motorola opened its first R&D facility in India in 1991.  In 2005, the company 
invested 85 million USD in technology and R&D, up from 50 million USD in 2002, and 
R&D spending was expected to grow by 10-20 percent per year.  In 2005, the 
company also officially opened Motorola Labs India to augment its existing R&D 
infrastructure of more than 1,700 software engineers.  The new lab engages in 
applied research in the areas of converged networks, enterprise applications and 
embedded systems, and physical sciences.ccxcvii  In 2006, Motorola launched another 
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R&D center in Hyderabad, its second largest R&D facility in India, housing over 1,000 
engineers engaged in pioneering development of new telecom switching 
technologies and products for a new class of computer.ccxcviii  
 Cummins, the world’s leading engine producer, had manufactured engines in Pune, 
India for over forty years, when it opened a research & technology (R&T) center 
there in 2003.  Much of the sophisticated software embedded in engines is designed 
in Cummins’ Columbus, Indiana plant, but code is being written by KPIT Cummins 
Infosystems Ltd., in Pune.  At Cummins’ new R&T center, 100 Indian engineers 
specializing in 3-D computer modeling and simulated testing of engines and 
components use powerful workstations to analyze engine designs for defects and 
performance.  Cummins’ decision to open up the new research center was 
motivated by the desire to cut costs and gain access to India’s highly educated, low-
cost engineers.ccxcix  
 
 
China, in particular, has greatly benefited from foreign corporate investment in R&D 
and technology transfer.  The USCC’s 2010 report noted that foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in China had grown from a mere trickle of a few billion dollars in 
the 1980s to more than 80 billion USD annually by 2008; it bypassed the United 
States as the destination for the largest amount of FDI in the world in 2003.  Of this, 
U.S. firms accounted for 15 billion USD in 2008 alone.ccc  FDI has been used not only 
to drive domestic economic growth through exports but also to gain access to 
foreign technology.  For many years, U.S. firms have participated in a variety of 
business arrangements in China that represent one or another form of technology 
transfer.ccci  Companies typically have agreed to donate equipment or sponsor 
scholarships for training Chinese workers in order to gain approval to set up 
facilities or enter into joint-venture manufacturing partnerships with Chinese 
enterprises.   
 
As Charles McMillion has observed, “from Microsoft and Intel to General Electric and 
General Motors, there are few global technology firms that do not have at least one 
R&D center in China working jointly with Chinese state controlled firms and 
universities.”cccii  At the same time, these arrangements with foreign enterprises have 
been a primary source of exports out of China of high-tech goods.  For example, the 
USCC 2010 report cites data that shows that two-thirds of the growth in Chinese 
exports of electronic information products in 2007 originated from foreign-owned 
companies, and one-sixth from joint ventures.ccciii  
 
But, as the USCC has observed, China’s ultimate aim is not to promote joint ventures 
and foreign investment, or even just generate exports, but to create a “large and/or 
globally dominant state-owned-and-controlled sector.”ccciv That is, through all the 
different arrangements it has forged with foreign corporations, from offsets to joint 
ventures and R&D centers that facilitate the transfer of industrial technologies, 
China’s goal is to enhance its own internal capacity for producing globally 
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competitive, world-class technologies and products.  U.S. policymakers are worried, 
however, not just that the migration of U.S. and other advanced industrial nation’s 
R&D and design capabilities is helping China in its drive to become a major global 
economic power, but that it is boosting technology capabilities critical to improving 
the military-industrial prowess of a country that the Defense Department worries 
could become a formidable military opponent.cccv  
 
New world leaders?  Although the offshore migration of American R&D 
resources may provide short-run competitive advantages to the U.S. companies that 
engage in it, this practice has taken a toll on the nation’s overall technological 
leadership in the world.  Several studies provide strong evidence that the United 
States has been losing its traditional world leadership in technology and innovation, 
not only relative to its traditional trading partners—Europe and Japan—but also to 
major emerging economies, namely India and China.   
 
 In 2005, the Task Force on the Future of American Innovation, comprised of the 
nation’s largest high-tech and manufacturing industry trade associations and 
major high-tech corporations, produced a benchmark study of innovation in the 
United States.  The study reports troubling trends in science and engineering 
(S&E) education, workforce, trade, knowledge creation, and R&D investment.  
According to this study, the United States appeared to be losing ground in every 
area relative to other developed and major developing countries (i.e., China), 
such as the share of S&E papers published worldwidecccvi and R&D investment.  
For example, the world’s fastest growing economies appear to be on track to 
catch up to U.S. R&D investment.  Between 1995 and 2001, China, South Korea, 
and Taiwan together increased their gross R&D investments by 140 percent, 
while over this same period, U.S. investment increased only by 34 percent.cccvii   
 
 A 2009 report of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, The 
Atlantic Century, Benchmarking EU and U.S. Innovation and Competitiveness, 
reaches similar conclusions: the United States, while still a major leader in 
innovation and competitiveness, is no longer the “runaway leader in global 
competitiveness that some believe it to be,” although it still leads Europe. The 
study ranks 40 countries/regions based on 16 indicators for assessing global 
competitiveness, which fall into six broad categories: human capital, innovation 
capacity, entrepreneurship, IT infrastructure, economic policy, and economic 
performance.cccviii  The United States ranked sixth in this listing, behind 
Singapore, Sweden, Luxembourg, Denmark, and South Korea.  More significantly, 
the it ranked 40th in the amount of improvement in the ITIF competitiveness 
score between 1999-2009.  By contrast, China and India were 1st and 14th 
respectively in the amount of improvement they made over the decade. 
  
 In 2009, the Boston Consultant Group ranked the United States 8th among 110 
nations, and second, behind South Korea, among the 20 largest countries 
(measured by GDP), on its International Innovation Index.  The study concluded 
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that, “Although still a top-tier player, it has fallen behind such countries as 
Singapore, South Korea, and Switzerland as an innovator.”  In addition, this 
report notes that the “United States is disadvantaged in several key areas, 
including workforce quality, and economic, immigration, and infrastructure 
policies.”  Finally, it reports that, based on its interviews with top executives, 
“the United States is losing its distinction as an innovation leader and may be 
underinvesting in its future.”cccix   
 
 The 2007 Georgia Institute of Technology’s bi-annual Hi-Tech Indicators (HTI), 
which measures the technology-based competitiveness of 33 nations, found that 
China had surpassed the United States in the rankings based on the indicators in 
this study.  According to the study, China improved its score from 22.5 in 1996 to 
82.8 in 2007, improving by 9 points between 2005 and 2007 alone.  The United 
States, which peaked at 95.4 in 1999 fell to 76.1 in 2007, dropping 6.8 points in 
the 2005-2007 period alone.   The Georgia Tech center has been measuring high-
tech competitiveness across nations for over 20 years.  The model it employs 
assumes that technology-based competitiveness depends on the conjunction of 
national orientation to compete, socio-economic infrastructure, technological 
infrastructure, and productive capacity.  Technological standing is tracked with 
one output factor addressing high technology export activity.cccx   
 
Regardless of the competitiveness indexes used, even those that have consistently 
placed the United States at the top of competitiveness/innovation rankings, a few 
conclusions stand out.  First, the United States remains a world leader, if not always 
the world leader, in technology competitiveness and innovation.   However, there 
are indications that U.S. leadership has been slipping over the past decade, and this 
alone has raised alarm bells for many industry and political leaders.  Most 
significantly, even though U.S. technological capabilities remain strong, other 
nations—most notably China, but also other Asian nations, including South Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia and India—have been rapidly gaining ground relative 
to the United States and the other major economic powers, i.e., Japan and Europe.   
 
As the Georgia Tech researchers observe, “China is rapidly heading to rival the 
United States as the principal driver of the world’s economy—a position the USA has 
held since the end of World War II.”cccxi  However, noting the impressive gains of 
other Asian nations, the Georgia Tech report concludes, “The expanded message is 
that global high tech competition will likely see not just China, but Asian economies 
more broadly, supplant Western leadership.”cccxii  
 
Eroding leadership in emerging technologies.  The U.S. ability to assert or 
maintain leadership in emerging technology areas is also jeopardized.  Examples 
where the United States has begun to lag internationally are given above, including 
advanced materials and semiconductors R&D.  As noted in Box F, Intel’s “teraflop 
research chip” and 45-nanometer technology are being developed in Intel-funded 
labs in India, indicating a transfer of advanced microprocessor design capacity.  
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Another emerging technology area where the United States has been losing ground 
is nanotechnology.  
 
Additionally, U.S. entrepreneurial activity in nanomaterials is very fast-paced, but 
Europe has greater investment in fundamental R&D, while Asian nations, especially 
China, Japan and Korea, have adopted and integrated nanotechnology research into 
large commercial enterprises, which may ultimately lead to profitable 
manufacturing of nanostructured materials.cccxiii  As a consequence, the NRS 
concluded, the “globalization of MSE [materials science and engineering] is 
narrowing the technology lead of the United States.”cccxiv The USCC further noted that 
some advanced technologies that originally migrated from the United States to 
Taiwan are now relocating to the mainland.cccxv 
 
In many areas of advanced technology, the United States remains the leader or part 
of a collective leadership, most often including Japan and Germany, but also with 
other developed nations in Europe and Asia in selected areas. China, in particular, is 
not just playing catch-up with the United States and the other developed nations 
regarding basic manufacturing production and advanced technology areas.   As the 
USCC 2005 report notes, China is developing and producing technology that “is 
increasing in sophistication at an unexpectedly fast pace.”cccxvi 
 
China has been able to leap frog in its technology development using technology and 
know-how obtained from foreign enterprises in ways that other developing nations 
have not been able to replicate.”cccxvii  China is rapidly becoming a source of 
innovative technology, and its technology research and development activities are 
steadily and substantially expanding.  Since it has become central to the global 
supply for technology goods of increasing sophistication, China has gained increased 
leverage in global systems of production.cccxviii  
 
China’s increasing technological prowess gained through its policies of developing 
advanced technologies important to its economy also contributes to the 
development of advanced technologies important to China’s military.  At the same 
time, the USCC warned, China’s becoming a major player at the center of the global 
technology supply chain raises “the prospect of future U.S. dependency on China for 
certain items critical to the U.S. defense industry as well as vital to continued 
economic leadership.”cccxix 
 
b.  Offshoring Critical Skills and Know-How 
As the United States loses its technological edge through movements of R&D 
offshore, underinvestment in R&D by U.S. industry, and lack of attention by the U.S. 
government, which has also caused the loss of millions of skilled workers, the know-
how, embodied in those displaced workers, and needed for maintaining and 
advancing the U.S. technology leadership vital for national security is being eroded.  
The dramatic loss of manufacturing jobs since 1998 afflicting almost every 
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industrial sector was illustrated in section IIa (table II and figure 9).  These losses 
also were accompanied by comparable losses in the number of manufacturing 
facilities in almost every sector, and for establishments of every size.   
  
Along with the economic hardship suffered by U.S. workers, their families and 
communities wrought by this movement of jobs overseas, the nation is paying a 
long-term price in the deterioration of U.S. industrial and technology leadership: 
 The large-scale reduction in the American high-skilled production and science 
and engineering workforces as manufacturing migrates offshore is leading to the 
loss of critical technological know-how needed to maintain U.S. leadership in 
technology areas critical to economic and national security;  
 The deterioration in the nation’s manufacturing base and technology leadership 
has created significant barriers to meeting the nation’s near- and long-term 
needs for sustaining a high-skilled, high-tech workforce.   
 
A Shrinking Skill and Knowledge Base.  In the technology transfer 
community, the process of technology transfer has been called a “contact sport”, 
meaning person-to-person interactions are an essential component in the exchange 
of knowledge, ideas, information and technical data that can enable a technology to 
go from the laboratory to the market place.  Although the Internet and advanced 
telecommunications have facilitated the exchange of information between 
individuals across great distances, personal, face-to-face contact and exchange 
between people is still crucial.  For example, Annalee Saxenian, regional economist, 
and Dean of the School of Information Management and Systems at U.C. Berkeley,  
has shown how California’s Silicon Valley’s rich culture of social networks and 
interactions among its high-tech professional workforce was crucial to the 
flourishing of innovation and the proliferation of successful high-tech firms in that 
region during the 1980s and 1990s.cccxx   
 
Harvard Business School professor Michael Porter has written extensively on the 
importance of industry clusters, such as that in Silicon Valley, to regional economies.  
Industrial clusters confer competitive advantages to related industries through their 
geographical proximity to product producers, service providers, suppliers of 
specialized inputs and infrastructure, supporting institutions (universities, 
community colleges, trade associations, unions, venture capital, and government 
agencies) and pools of skilled, experienced workers.  These clusters foster 
technological innovation and are key drivers of regional economic growth.  Although 
some drivers of innovation may be national in scope, many, if not most, are regional 
in nature and are tied to specific regional industrial clusters. Technological 
spillovers are magnified by the proximity of interdependent firms and related 
industries.cccxxi   
 
But as U.S. firms move their manufacturing operations and plants offshore, and 
reduce or cease their investment at home, the advantages of regional industrial 
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clustering fade, and R&D and technology innovation resources move away as well.  
Most notably, this loss includes the skilled workforces, both production and 
professional, which embody the know-how and skills essential for maintaining the 
nation’s technological edge. 
 
S&E and high-skilled employment.  Although some economists and 
proponents of globalization have argued that the loss of manufacturing jobs has 
largely fallen on low-skilled production workers, a very large portion,  if not most, of 
manufacturing workers are actually high-skilled and well-trained.  In fact, they tend 
to be more skilled than workers in most other sectors of the economy.  The 
manufacturing workforce includes large numbers of engineers and scientists, as 
well as machinists, technicians, high-skilled assemblers, machine tool operators, 
mechanics, process control operators, computer systems operators and inspectors, 
and many others types of production workers.  These workers embody an 
enormous range of tacit knowledge and know-how that may be irretrievably lost to 
the American economy as manufacturing plants shut down and move overseas.  
 
Moreover, the offshoring of R&D and design work and U.S. establishment of offshore 
R&D centers is displacing highly educated engineers, scientists and technical 
professionals.  While companies such as Alcatel-Lucent, Motorola, GE, and Boeing, 
among many other major high-tech firms, have been cutting back on science and 
engineering (S&E) workers in their U.S. R&D facilities, they have been hiring at their 
R&D centers in China and elsewhere around the world.  As high-tech semiconductor 
and computer makers offshore the design and manufacturing of their products to 
contract manufacturers and design outfits, work that was once done onshore by U.S. 
workers, this capacity is no longer readily available in the United States.  Similarly, 
as aerospace companies, such as Boeing and Lockheed, make offset arrangements 
that shift work to foreign companies that used be done by U.S. workers—including 
technology development and design work—critical technological, engineering and 
production know-how is diminished, if not entirely lost.   
 
As the following examples illustrate, similar trends are seen in diverse sectors that 
also supply critical products, technologies and systems to the defense base.   
  
 Aerospace.  The aerospace industry’s long-term employment trend has been 
downward since the 1980s.  Total aerospace and parts (NAICS 3363) employment 
fell over 40 percent since 1990, dropping from nearly 900,000 to under 490,000 in 
2010.  Since the last employment peak in 1998, about 15 percent of jobs in this 
sector have been lost, probably permanently.  The aerospace nonproduction and 
supervisory workforce, which is inclusive of the S&E workforce has suffered even 
greater losses, fell by more than half since 1990 and nearly 30 percent since the 
1998 peak.cccxxii   
 
Stanley Sorscher, legislative director of the Society of Professional Engineering 
Employees in Aerospacecccxxiii (the union representing over 20,000 engineers, 
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scientists, technical and professional employees in the aerospace industry), testified 
before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee about the long-term decline in 
aerospace S&E employment.  He stated that between 1986 and 2001, the number of 
U.S. aerospace S&Es fell by 83 percent, from 145,000 to 21,000, and by another 
5,000 by 2005, paralleling the 18,000 machinists jobs lost over this same period at 
Boeing.cccxxiv  “This decline,” he asserted, “dismantles our technical and 
manufacturing communities from within, eroding the network of relationships, 
expertise and authority developed over decades.”  Sorscher partly attributes the 
losses in his workforce and in U.S. technological capacity, to offset agreements, 
which enable foreign firms to “acquire the knowledge, skills and experience 
embodied in the work packages sent to their domestic firms.”  These firms also “will 
inherit the competitive advantage of future learning curve benefits.  They will learn 
certain institutional lessons while our body of retained knowledge erodes,” he 
warned.cccxxv 
 
 Printed Circuit Boards.  A more troubling situation exists in the printed 
circuit board industry.  As described above (see Section IIIb). both the PCB 
assembly and bare PCB industries have lost significant numbers of jobs and 
establishments, especially over the last decade. As the National Research Council 
report on the industry notes, most of these lost jobs were high-tech well paying 
manufacturing jobs.  The NRC further notes that these cuts were made across all 
jobs descriptions as plants closed because of bankruptcy or relocation to Asia.   
Since no major technological change was introduced into the industry over the 
same period, productivity increases had little to do with the losses, “so the decrease 
can be almost wholly attributable to production moved from U.S. to overseas 
locations,” the report contends.cccxxvi   
 
The NRC report also tracks the almost total loss of the technical service and 
engineering workforce at what it calls “Tier I” suppliers to the electronic 
interconnection industry in the Untied States.  As in most U.S. manufacturing, 
secondary, or “Tier II,” suppliers have, “with few exceptions, passed direct sales and 
technical support of PCB products to Tier II distributors, who have little technical 
background and have difficulty troubleshooting products in any depth.”  Thus the 
downsizing of this industry’s workforce, which entails first and foremost the loss of 
skilled workers, leads to “the loss of capacity for innovation and the ability to 
compete for state-of-the-art contracts,” followed by continued erosion of technical 
competency over time.  “These resources,” the report concludes, “most likely will 
not be replenished in the current environment.”cccxxvii 
 
 Semiconductors.  The loss of skilled high-tech workers is taking a similar toll 
in the semiconductor industry.  After a booming decade in the 1990s, the industry 
has shed over 100,000 jobs, well over one-third of its workforce, since 2000, and 
modest job losses continued in 2010.  According to industry leader William Spencer, 
the production of state-of-the-art integrated circuits requires a wide variety of 
interdependent skills, which need to be honed constantly in order to stay on the 
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cutting edge.cccxxviii  But, he warned that, 
. . . as the number of first-line fabs decreases and as competition grows for scarce 
top-level human resources, risks to the health and vibrancy of U.S. clusters grow as 
well.  The redirection or dissolution of semiconductor production clusters in the 
United States would likely result in the loss of on-the-job training and shifts in 
career choices for engineers while reducing activity in associated industries, which 
are also high-value-added and R&D intensive.  This, in turn could lead to the loss of 
learning skills needed for promising new sectors such as solid-state lighting and 
nanotechnologies, while at the same time calling into question the country’s ability 
to retain the current level of R&D capabilities.cccxxix 
 
 Materials.  The close linkage between manufacturing migration and the loss 
of technological know-how is also apparent in the metallurgical sectors.  The NRC 
study on globalization of materials R&D associated with the continuing loss of 
trained researchers in metallurgy with a concomitant loss of corporate expertise in 
producing, refining, processing, and applying the metals that constitute the basic 
engineered material of industry.cccxxx 
 
An aging skilled workforce.  The growing loss of technical skills and erosion of 
the knowledge base is exacerbated in many manufacturing sectors by the aging of 
the skilled workforce, a large part of which will start retiring over the next couple of 
decades.  It is not clear how new generations of workers with the right skills will be 
recruited to replace older workers as they retire.  This concern cuts across 
occupational lines, from production to S&E workforces. The National Science 
Foundation (NSF) has predicted that the rate of growth in the number of S&E-
trained persons in the workforce will be slowed as more S&E workers reach the 
traditional retirement age.  The NSF notes that, across all S&E degree levels, by age 
61 about half of S&E workers no longer work full time, and for doctorate holders, 
half no longer work full time by age 66.  Finally, the NSF reports that a larger portion 
of doctorate degree holders than those with bachelors and masters degrees are 
approaching retirement.cccxxxi 
 
Sorsher noted Boeing’s aging technical workforce and the “total elimination” of 
younger workers at the company as it has downsized.  Thus, “lacking young people 
in the workplace, no one is present to capture and retain the body of knowledge 
accumulated from decades of experience.  The next generation of supervisors, 
managers and system integrators cannot be cultivated if they are not present.”  As a 
result, “a 15-year period of experience has been forgone and cannot be 
recovered.”cccxxxii    
 
Similarly, Amy Praeger of the American Shipbuilding Association testified before the 
USCC that since 1991, 24,000 engineers and production jobs were lost in the U.S. 
shipbuilding industry, with many skilled workers leaving because the sector does 
not have consistent and stable contracts with the military, a major and important 
customer for this sector.  She added that replacing this skilled workforce could take 
15 years in order to replicate the lost skill level.cccxxxiii  Along the same lines, the 
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majority of the current approximately 30,000 workers in the printed circuit board 
industry will reach retirement in the 2015 to 2020 time frame.  According to the 
NRC, current industry trends “will make it difficult for corporate leadership to 
attract a future talent pool to continue to serve the industry’s requirements.”cccxxxiv 
 
Losing the edge.   Ever since the early 2000s, industry, government, 
academic and political leaders have been raising the alarm that the United States has 
begun to lose its scientific and technological leadership in the world.   For example, 
the 2005 NRC report, Rising Above the Gathering Storm, acknowledges that while the 
United States remained the undisputed leader in basic and applied research, and an 
international leader in applying research and innovation to the improvement of 
economic performance,cccxxxv it was “deeply concerned that the scientific and 
technological building blocks critical to our economic leadership are eroding at a 
time when many other nations are gathering strength.”cccxxxvi 
 
Several of the most important trends that suggest the U.S. S&T leadership is eroding 
are summarized in Box G.  Drawing on National Science Foundation and 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data, these 
trends include U.S. and international comparisons of R&D performance and 
spending, ratios of R&D spending and GDP, numbers of S&E publications (article 
output), numbers of researchers, numbers of first university natural sciences and 
engineering (NS&E) degrees (bachelors degree in the United States) and the ratio of 
this number to the college-age population, and the number of NS&E doctoral 
degrees awarded.  These indicators allow useful comparative assessments of the 
size, scope and strength of national S&T institutions and capabilities.   
 
By any measure, the United States was unquestionably the leader in science and 
technology for the last half of the 20th century, from the 1950s through 2000.   
Beginning in 2000, although in absolute terms America has continued to spend 
more on R&D, it has more scientists and engineers in its workforce, and with 
notable exceptions continues to turn out more S&E graduates than any other nation, 
the trends in these areas slowed or even reversed.  Although some of the trends 
showed some sign of recovery from 2004 on, it remains to be seen if the upward 
movement of prior decades will be restored, or whether the U.S. R&D and S&E 
workforce patterns—especially relative to China and other economic competitors—
will settle into a generally slower rate of growth, if not decline.   
 
What direction these trends take, of course, will depend on economic factors and 
government policies, neither of which can be known ex ante.  The impacts on these 
trends on the recent economic crisis and financial system meltdown are also 
uncertain, though it is possible, if not likely, that these events have put a damper on 
these trends.   One trend remains clear and unchanged, however:  China—and to a 
lesser extent, other emerging economies—has rapidly been gaining ground in all 
areas of science and technology, relative to the United States, as well as to the other 
major advanced industrial nations.    
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The implication of these, and the many related trends described in this report, is 
that the U.S. industrial skill and knowledge central to maintaining on the cutting 
edge in technology development and innovation in areas ultimately vital to 
maintaining the nation’s national security industrial base, has been deteriorating, 
both absolutely and relatively.  Other nations are challenging American 
technological leadership, which ultimately rests on having access to a broad, robust 
foundation of manufacturing and technological skills and knowledge. 
 
 
Box G 
U.S. and International Comparisons of R&D and S&E Trends 
 
R&D Performance and Spending  
 Private industry accounts for the largest share of U.S. R&D performance and 
expenditures.  Its share of U.S. R&D performance increased from 66 percent in the 
early 1970s to a high of 75 percent in 2000, and then dipped to 69 percent in 2002, 
following the 2001-02 recession, when firms curtailed R&D growth.  Similarly, 
private industry funding for R&D as a share of the U.S. total rose from about 40 
percent in the early 1970s to a peak of 70 percent in 2000, before dipping to 64 
percent in 2004.  In constant dollar terms, the drops in industrial R&D performance 
and funding after 2000 were the largest in the post-WWII period.  Private industry 
R&D performance and funding then grew again, to 67 percent in 2008.cccxxxvii 
 Over the past two decades, R&D performance and funding were dominated by the 
30 developed member nations of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD).  For more than a decade, however, selected economies in 
Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere have been rising rapidly.  The National Science 
Foundation reports that the average annual real R&D growth rate of nine non-OECD 
nations (Argentina, China, Israel, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovenia, 
South Africa, and Taiwan) was 15.5 percent from 1995 to 2005, compared with an 
OECD average of 5.8 percent.cccxxxviii  The combined share of the United States and 
Japan, the two largest R&D-performing countries, declined from 56% of the world 
R&D total in 1995 to 47% in 2007.cccxxxix 
 The expansion of China’s R&D spending and performance has been the most rapid 
and sustained.  According to OECD data, China’s R&D expenditures in 2000 (45 
billion USD) was the fourth largest in the world, and increased in 2007 to an 
estimated 102 billion USD, pushing it to third place, behind Japan.cccxl  As the NSF 
reports, China’s “nearly decade-long, steep ramp-up of R&D expenditures and R&D 
is unprecedented in the recent past.”cccxli  Its real average annual growth rate 
between 1997 and 2007 was exceptionally high at just above 19 percent—compared 
to the U.S. rate of 3.3 percent.cccxlii  Other less-developed countries on the way to 
becoming large R&D performers include Brazil (14 billion USD in 2004) and India (21 
billion USD in 2000).cccxliii 
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 The United States ranked eighth in the world in terms of reported R&D/GDP ratios 
(2.7 percent in 2007) in the most recent year for which data was available, falling 
behind Israel, Sweden, South Korea, Finland, Japan, Switzerland, and Iceland. The 
U.S. ratio in 2007 was still somewhat lower than its 2000-01 levels.  Despite its 
quickly rising investment in R&D, China reported a ratio of only 1.5 percent in 2007, 
but this still represents a dramatic rise from 0.6 in 1995, and it must be kept in mind 
that China’s GDP has been marked by sustained, record growth.cccxliv 
 The United States accounts for the largest share of world S&E article output by far, 
though it lost ground between 1995 and 2007, as other nations’ outputs have 
grown.  The U.S. output grew at an average annual rate of 0.7 percent, less than 
most other major developed nations’ (Japan, Germany, Canada, Italy, Finland) and 
many large developing nations’ (China, India, Brazil) output, falling from 34.2 
percent to 27.7 percent of the world total.  China had the fastest growing output in 
the world, 16.5 percent average annual growth (South Korea’s rate was second, with 
14.1 percent); China’s share rose from 1.6 percent to 7.5 percent of the world total.  
In 2007, China was the world’s 2nd largest producer of S&E articles, followed by 
Japan, United Kingdom, and Germany—a meteoric rise from 15th place in 1995.cccxlv  
 
S&E Labor Force 
 The United States has historically had the largest reported number of researchers in 
the world, a number that increased by 42 percent between 1995 and 2007.   Over 
the same 12-year period the number of researchers in China grew by 173 percent to 
more than 1.4 million in 2007—a rise from about half the U.S. number in 1995 to 
close to the estimated U.S. figure, and greater than that of the EU-27.  South Korea’s 
number of researchers also grew dramatically, by 121 percent, while Japan’s number 
of researchers grew by only 5 percent over this period.cccxlvi  
 The United States has fallen from one of the top countries in terms of the ratio of 
first university natural sciences and engineering (NS&E) degrees to the college-age 
population (20-24-year-olds), to near the bottom of 23 countries for which data are 
available.  The NSF reports that in 1975, only Japan had a higher ratio than the 
United States.  By 1990, a few other countries/economies had higher ratios than the 
United States, and by 2005, nearly all nations in that group had surpassed the U.S. 
ratio.cccxlvii In addition, the number of first university NS&E degrees grew sharply in 
China, more than trebling between 1998 and 2006, compared to an 18 percent 
increase for the United States.  China has long surpassed the United States in total 
first university NS&E degrees.  While it granted only slightly more degrees than the 
United States in 1998, it granted degrees to well over three times the U.S. figure in 
2006.cccxlviii   
 In 2006, the United States awarded the largest number of S&E doctorates of any 
country (about 30,000), with China second (about 23,000), followed by Russia, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom.  In terms of the number of NS&E doctoral 
degrees, the United States was number one again in 2006, but China has been 
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rapidly catching up, and has possibly already surpassed the United States.  The 
number of engineering doctorates follows a similar pattern (see figure 20), though 
China’s engineering doctoral awards surpassed the number awarded by the United 
States in 2002.  Before 2002, the United States accounted for the largest number of 
such degrees (about 6,000) awarded in the world, and China awarded less than half 
that.   In 2006, China granted 12,130 awards compared to 7,402 in the United States, 
and this differential appears to be steadily growing.cccxlix  
 
Figure 20 
Number of Engineering Doctorates Awarded, 1998-2006 
U.S., Japan, Germany and China 
 
               Source: National Science Board, Science & Engineering Indicators, 2010 
 
 
Many of these nations have implemented strategic industrial policies to strengthen 
their technological capabilities, innovation, and competitiveness built around 
investments to attract and build a strong, modern manufacturing base.  U.S. policies 
in contrast have encouraged U.S. manufacturers to move more and more of their 
operations offshore, increasingly moving up the technological value chain, which 
has encouraged the migration of R&D capacity and technological know-how, and 
enhances the competitiveness of economic, and potentially military, competitors.   
 
This diagnosis is sobering.  The loss of skilled production workers, scientists, 
engineers, and technical and professional workers across the manufacturing sector 
means that the next best idea, the next innovation, and the next generation of 
products will be made somewhere else, not in the United States.  This loss of 
High Road Strategies 
     
 
92 
HRS/JSY—Manufacturing Insecurity 
 
manufacturing capacity—and the intellectual and technical capability to make 
things—is a profound threat to the nation’s economy and national security.  The 
seed corn of our future is being planted in someone else’s economy. 
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V.  Conclusion 
Although America’s manufacturing sector is still the largest, most productive, and 
most innovative in the world, the broad domestic and global economic trends 
examined in this report provide substantial evidence that the U.S. manufacturing 
base has been undergoing a steady and potentially dangerous erosion, especially 
over the last decade.  Manufacturing’s share of U.S. GDP has been falling steadily 
since the 1960s, but dropped since 2000 at twice the rate of the previous 15 years.  
Not only has the United States lost over 6 million manufacturing jobs—with 
manufacturing employment falling to its lowest level since 1940—nearly 60,000 
manufacturing facilities of all sizes, including one-third of plants with over 500 
employees, have disappeared from America’s shores since 1998.   
 
U.S. manufacturing competitiveness also has been declining in global markets, as 
indicated by America’s massive and steadily growing trade deficits in goods—
alleviated only by the recent recession—including growing trade deficits in 
advanced technology products, once a major area of American comparative 
advantage, and rapidly increasing foreign import penetration into U.S. markets.   
 
Even economic indicators that some analysts point to as indicators of 
manufacturing’s strength show clear evidence of weakening upon closer 
examination.  While U.S. manufacturing’s real value-added has generally been 
positive, its annual rate of growth since 2000 has been substantially lower than its 
growth rates in previous decades.  Similarly, manufacturing industrial capacity 
growth and capacity utilization have been much lower since 2000 compared to 
previous periods. 
 
These trends are replicated in nearly every major industry within the 
manufacturing sector.  Industries as far-ranging as semiconductors, printed circuit 
boards, machine tools, advanced materials, ball bearings, optoelectronics, and even 
aircraft manufacturing have experienced the movement of significant, and in some 
cases large, shares of their production capacity to lower-cost foreign locations.   
Since a wide variety of manufacturing industries are inclusive of subsectors that 
supply products, components and technologies that the Pentagon considers 
important to defense—and are critical sources of innovation, the significant declines 
in plant capacity and jobs raise serious concerns about their long-term ability to 
remain sufficiently innovative and robust to meet military supply needs, especially 
during periods of international crisis.  
 
The erosion and overseas migration of domestic manufacturing is also weakening 
America’s R&D and innovation capacity, and undermining its global technological 
leadership.  As shown in this report, the design, development and production of 
commercial and defense-specific technologies and products are tightly linked.  In 
every industry sector examined, R&D capacity has been following production 
offshore or, in the case of aerospace, has been purposely given to foreign producers 
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in offset arrangements attached to sales contracts.  If the civilian manufacturing 
base that is critical to maintaining the national innovation system deteriorates, and 
America’s innovative capacity moves overseas to be closer to production and the 
necessary support base, the underlying technological capability for the nation’s 
defense industrial base also will deteriorate.  And as the United States loses its 
technological edge through movements of R&D offshore, underinvestment in R&D 
by U.S. private industry, and lack of attention to this critical loss by the U.S. 
government—with the shedding of millions of skilled workers as a result—the 
know-how needed for maintaining and advancing U.S. technology leadership vital 
for national security, and embodied in those displaced workers, is being lost as well.    
 
Indeed, as shown in a number of studies discussed here, U.S. manufacturing and 
technological leadership has been slipping over the past decade, not only relative to 
its traditional trading partners—Europe and Japan—but to major emerging 
economies, most notably China and India, but also to other Asian nations, such as 
Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Malaysia.  For example, a recent joint study by 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu and the U.S. Council on Competitiveness, ranked the 
United States fourth—after China, India and Korea—in its multifaceted global 
manufacturing competitiveness index.  For each of the leading Asian countries, 
strength in research and development, innovation, and the availability of highly 
skilled workers, scientists, researchers, and engineers were identified as key drivers 
in their competiveness designation.  Meanwhile, the United States was projected to 
fall to fifth place in the rankings, overtaken by Brazil, in 5 years.cccl  
 
The findings of this report point to important implications regarding public policies 
for strengthening the nation’s defense industrial base.  Programs such as the 
Pentagon’s “trusted” investments in critical defense technologies for which domestic 
capacity has all but disappeared, and the more controversial “Buy America” 
requirements on defense procurement remain important, and should be supported.  
However, as one defense analyst quipped, referring to the DOD’s “trusted” approach 
for the PCB industry, it is no more effective than “putting a Band-Aid on a bullet 
hole.”cccli   Only a comprehensive strategy aimed at reversing the erosion in the 
nation’s overall manufacturing base will be sufficient for preserving and revitalizing 
the nation’s defense industrial base in the coming decades.   
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